### Title
Operation Amaryllis: French Evacuation Operation in Rwanda 1994—Lessons Learned for Future German Noncombatant Evacuation Operations?

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### Abstract
In April 1994 a genocide took place in Rwanda that led to the death of more than 800,000 people. This study analyzes the French Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) “Amaryllis” in Rwanda, conducted in order to rescue European citizens, who were in extreme danger during the riots. While the French conducted their NEO, the German Armed Forces realized that they were unprepared to conduct an evacuation operation. To remedy this deficiency, the German Armed Forces developed their own NEO capability from 1994 to 1999. This study assesses the successful French Operation Amaryllis and develops 21 “lessons learned.” Furthermore, the study reviews the German Armed Forces effort to develop a NEO capability and their NEOs in Albania in 1997 and in Eritrea in 1998. Finally, this study evaluates whether the German Armed Forces have learned their lessons from Operation Amaryllis.
OPERATION AMARYLLIS: FRENCH EVACUATION OPERATION IN RWANDA 1994--LESSONS LEARNED FOR FUTURE GERMAN NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE General Studies

by

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2000

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Lessons Learned for future German Non Combatant Evacuation Operations?

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or
any other governmental agency. (Reference to this study should include the foregoing
statement).
ABSTRACT

OPERATION AMARYLLIS: FRENCH EVACUATION OPERATION IN RWANDA 1994--LESSONS LEARNED FOR FUTURE GERMAN NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS? by LTC Uwe F. Jansohn, Germany, 144 pages

In April 1994 a genocide took place in Rwanda that led to the death of more than 800,000 people. This study analyzes the French Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) “Amaryllis” in Rwanda, conducted in order to rescue European citizens, who were in extreme danger during the riots. While the French conducted their NEO, the German Armed Forces realized that they were unprepared to conduct an evacuation operation. To remedy this deficiency, the German Armed Forces developed their own NEO capability from 1994 to 1999. This study assesses the successful French Operation Amaryllis and develops 21 “lessons learned.” Furthermore, the study reviews the German Armed Forces effort to develop a NEO capability and their NEOs in Albania in 1997 and in Eritrea in 1998. Finally, this study evaluates whether the German Armed Forces have learned their lessons from Operation Amaryllis.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

3emeRPiMa  3eme Régiment Parachutiste d' Infanterie de Marine” (3rd Marine Paratrooper Regiment)

13eme RDP  13eme Régiment de Dragons Parachutistes (Dragoon Paratroop Regiment, long range reconnaissance regiment)

AAA       Anti-Air-Artillery

ACP       Demi-antenne chirurgicale parachutiste (hospital)

AMT       Assistance Militaire Technique

ANBw      Amt fuer Nachrichtenwesen der Bundeswehr (Federal Armed Forces Intelligence Office)

APOE      Airport of Embarkation

APOD      Airport of Debarkation

C2        Command and Control

CEA       Compagnie d’Eclairage et d’Appui (reconnaissance and combat support company)

CEMA      Chef d’Etat-major des Armées (Chief of the French General Staff)

CENTREVAC Centre d’Evacuation (Evacuation Center)

COIA      Centre Operationelles Inter Armées (Operations Center)

COIATh    Commandant interarmées de théâtre (the joint commander in theater)

COMEFEAO Commander of the Eléments Français d’Assistance Opérationelle (staff operating from Bangui and exercising interservice command and control of all French forces in Africa)

COMOPS    Commandant d’opération

COMTACTER Commandant tactique terre (tactical commander of the ground forces)
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<th>COS</th>
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<td>CPX</td>
<td>Command Post Exercise</td>
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<td>CRAP</td>
<td>Commandos de Recherche et d’Action dans la Profondeur (Commandos)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRM</td>
<td>Direction du renseignement militaire (French Military Intelligence Office)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EinsVbdEvakOp</td>
<td>Einsatzverband Evakuierungsoperationen (Task Force NEO)</td>
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<td>EMA</td>
<td>Etat Major d’Armées (French General Staff)</td>
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<td>EMIA</td>
<td>Etat major interarmées de planification opérationnelle (Joint Operational Planning Staff)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EvakVbd</td>
<td>Evakuierungsverband (Evacuation Unit)</td>
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<td>FAR</td>
<td>Force Armees Ruandaises</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIKdo</td>
<td>Flottenkommando (German Fleet Command)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPR</td>
<td>Force Patriotiques Ruandaises, Tutsi rebel forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTX</td>
<td>Field Training Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>FueZBW</td>
<td>Fuehrungszentrum (Operations Center of the Ministry of Defense)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GI</td>
<td>Generalinspekteur (Chief of Federal Armed Forces Staff)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GUEPARD</td>
<td>A base formation (détachement) with varying readiness levels, always kept on standby in France for NEO operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>GP</td>
<td>Garde Présidentielle (Presidential Guard)</td>
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<td>HFueKdo</td>
<td>Heeresfuehrungskommando (German Army Forces Command)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLK/4.Div</td>
<td>Kommando Luftbewegliche Kraefte (Command Air mobile forces/4th Div)</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>KSK</td>
<td>Kommando Spezialkräfte (Special Forces Command)</td>
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<td>LBAT</td>
<td>luftbewegliche Arzttrupps (air-mobile medical officer teams)</td>
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<td>LLRZ</td>
<td>Luftlanderrettungszentrum (airmobile hospital)</td>
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<td>LwFueKdo</td>
<td>Luftwaffenfuehrungskommando (German Air Force Command)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILAN</td>
<td>MILAN (French/German anti-tank missile)</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>MAM</td>
<td>Mission d'Assistance Militaire (Military coordination cell in the Embassy)</td>
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<td>NEO</td>
<td>Non Combatant Evacuation Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Nations</td>
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<td>PIZ</td>
<td>Presse- und Informationszentrum (Media and information center)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>SETAF</td>
<td>Southern European Task Force</td>
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<td>SCHNOPS</td>
<td>Datenbank Schnell ablaufende Operationen (a central joint database fast operations)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
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<td>UNOMUR</td>
<td>United Nations Mission Uganda-Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAREUR</td>
<td>United States Army Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEV</td>
<td>Standardevakuierungsverband (standard evacuation task force)</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Problem Definition And Importance

Africa has been the scene of a multitude of political crises in the last decade that has led to riots, civil wars, and genocide. These crises often threaten citizens of the United States and Western Europe living abroad in African countries. Sometimes, a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), conducted by military forces, is the only way to save their lives. For this reason, it is necessary to maintain specially trained and equipped forces and to develop specific NEO procedures. The improvement of these procedures has to be a continuous process.

In April 1994, a genocide took place in Rwanda that led to the death of at least 800,000 people. Confronted for the first time in its history with the need to evacuate German citizens out of Rwanda, the German Army went through a painful experience. It had no training programs, equipment, or doctrine that would enable it to successfully conduct a NEO. German citizens were finally evacuated from Rwanda by French and Belgian paratroopers in Operations “Amaryllis” (French) and “Silver Back” (Belgian). As demonstrated in Operation Amaryllis, French Army procedures were optimal for this kind of operation and can serve as a model for the development of a German NEO capability.

Background Of The Research Question

During early April 1994, frantic activities were noted in several garrison locations of the German Armed Forces. The 26th Airborne Brigade stationed in Saarlouis, which
is in the southwest of Germany, hurriedly put together a combat task force composed of an airborne infantry company and several armored airborne weapons carriers. An ongoing commando platoon-leader course being conducted at the German Airborne school at Altenstadt was cut short so that instructors could be rallied for special missions. Everybody packed up ammunition and equipment. The UH-1-D helicopters were on standby at an airfield in the south of Germany ready to be loaded onto Transall transport aircraft. What had happened?

Rwanda is a small, hilly Central African state, about the size of Connecticut, with a population estimated at over 8 million prior to 1994. In the evening of 6 April 1994, an airplane carrying Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana was shot down while approaching the airport of Kigali, the capital of the Rwanda. The presumed assassination triggered riots between Hutu and Tutsi factions, the two major ethnic groups in the country. This factional conflict quickly developed into nation-wide ethnic genocide. The majority ethnic group in Rwanda, the Hutu tribe, began an indescribable massacre of the minority Tutsi ethnic group. Caught in the middle of these riots, European citizens living in Rwanda were placed in extreme danger. The urgency for an evacuation was made clear after ten Belgian soldiers and two French gendarmes had been killed. From a German perspective, the critical point came when operators of the German broadcasting station Deutsche Welle that conducted radio broadcasts across the entire African continent from the Rwandan capital, were trapped in their radio station by the rioting masses.

As the result of the decision-making process within the German Ministry of Defense, the German Armed Forces had to admit that they were unprepared to conduct an
evacuation operation. The reasons for this lack of preparation were diverse. Missing vaccinations, inadequate equipment, and no non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) experience were some of the major reasons precluding a rescue mission. Fortunately, Belgian and French troops were able to evacuate the German broadcasters.

During the period following the Rwandan crisis, the German Ministry of Defense was not idle. Lieutenant General Bagger, who at that time was the Chief of the Army staff, clearly stated, “I do not want to see repeated what happened in Rwanda, which in plain words means, from now on, the German Armed Forces must be able to handle a crises like this themselves.”

His statement led to the development of the “Grundsatzweisung zur Vorbereitung und Durchführung Militärischer Evakuierungsoperationen” (Basic Principles for the Preparation and the Conduct of Military Evacuation Operations). Furthermore, the general’s statement led to the creation of a special NEO-capable force, the “Kommando Spezialkräfte” (KSK (Special Forces Command)) stationed in the Black Forest region of Germany.

The Research Question

The primary question that this paper seeks to answer is: what are the implications of lessons learned from the French Operation “Amaryllis” for potential German noncombatant evacuation operations?

Related Subordinate Questions

To answer the primary question, the following subordinate questions are also addressed. First, what had the situation in Rwanda been that required that a NEO be conducted in 1994? This question comprises the answers to what is the historical
background for the crisis, what were the warning signals, and what did the military
geography look like?

Secondly, this paper answers the question, how did France conduct Operation
Amaryllis? What happened during the six days of this NEO?

The third subordinate question concerns what was learned as a result of the
analysis and the examination of French NEO doctrine in 1994 and its execution during
Operation Amaryllis. This question is broken down into the following sub-issues: what
were the alert procedures and the Command & Control procedures? How did
reconnaissance and collection of intelligence influence the planning process? What
special role did the Special Forces, the Air Force, the Allies, and logistical and medical
support play?

The fourth and final subordinate question examines what approaches the German
Army undertook in developing a NEO capability after the failure in Rwanda and whether
there is still a need for refinement.

Definitions

This thesis uses the German Ministry of Defense terminology for “noncombatant
evacuation operation” that defines NEO as

Operations of military forces with the purpose of protection and the rescue of own
citizens, usually with the inclusion of citizens of additional countries, who are
recently life threatened. These operations have to be conducted when a foreign
government is not able or refuses to guarantee their safety and when peaceful
measures don’t promise success. NEO must be restricted only to the protection of
the citizens. NEOs have to be commensurate.
Limitations and Delimitations

This research provides a German viewpoint of NEOs that is oriented on German military capabilities and assets. The conclusions do not cover the US Armed Forces, with their capability for a strategic power projection. Furthermore, this paper does not claim to have found a crystal ball solution for the conduct of NEOs. Conclusions drawn are the results of studying French NEO doctrine in 1994 and how it was executed in one successful evacuation operation: Operation Amaryllis. The research does not compare the French operation with other NEOs such as, for example, the American operations in Liberia 1996 (Assured Response), Central African Republic 1996 (Quick Response), or the operation in Somalia (Eastern Exit) in 1991.

The French example is not proposed as the only feasible way to conduct NEOs, but is used to illustrate concepts. It should be noted that there are important differences between French and German Armed Forces. For example, French forces are permanently stationed in Africa.

The scope of this thesis is limited to the military requirements of a NEO. Nevertheless, the research was not limited to the official description of the events from the French viewpoint. Secondary sources, as well as recently available sources and impressions of eyewitnesses, were used to provide additional perspectives of the operation. Hence, the thesis offers a far more critical review than earlier studies about the manner in which French forces conducted the NEO.
Significance Of The Study

German forces must be able to evacuate their citizens from locations around the world. From this perspective, one well-known evacuation was the German NEO conducted in Albania in March 1997. For the first time in its history, Germany took responsibility for the evacuation of 140 European citizens from Albania at the outbreak of a civil war. Germany named the NEO Operation Libelle (Dragonfly), while the Americans called it, Operation Silver Wake. American and German soldiers met one year later again on a dusty airfield in Asmara, the capital of the African state of Eritrea, after conflict between this country and its neighbor Ethiopia broke out again.

A crisis can erupt quickly in any part of the world; in many cases, the development of a crisis cannot be foreseen. The Bundeswehr must be ready and prepared to react to such crises wherever they may occur in the world. Nonetheless, in times of decreasing military budgets, it is an increasingly challenging task to accomplish this goal. What can be done?

The most efficient way to optimize forces, procedures, assets, and means is to learn from the successes and the mistakes of previous NEOs. The evaluation of the French NEO Operation Amaryllis offers valuable lessons. At the same time, it is also wise to test the lessons learned through training exercises and German NEOs like Operation Dragonfly in Albania or the NEO in Eritrea. Germany follows this principle today.

The author of this thesis was responsible for developing the scenario for the first NEO training exercise of German Army Forces Command called “Schneller Delphin” (Quick Dolphin) in January 1999. The German Army conducted a NEO in a fictitious
state modeled after the territory of Rwanda and Burundi. In the same month, the author was a member of a German observer mission in the exercise “Agile Lion” conducted by United States Army Europe (USAREUR) in Vicenza, Italy. During this exercise, USAREUR trained the American Southern European Task Force (SETAF) to carry out an evacuation mission in Burundi. These exercises reflect the fact that NEOs have not only been a growing concern for Germany but also for other states in the post-cold war era.

Research Method

This paper is partially based on previous research the author conducted in 1996 at the Fuehrungsakademie in Hamburg. The Fuehrungsakademie is a facility comparable to the Command and General Staff College. The research was made possible because the French forces granted access to information on the conduct of Operation Amaryllis in the form of face-to-face interviews with representatives of the French General Staff (Etat Major d’Armées (EMA)) and its Operation Center (Centre Opérationelles Inter Armées(COIA)). At the time of the earlier research, this was the only material available. Today, newly unclassified material has come to light, and it has been used in this paper to validate or to qualify the conclusions made previously by the author. Personal interviews with a Belgian and a Rwandan officer, which were involved in the events of 1994, served the same goal.

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2 Also called Beladonna lily, an amaryllidaceous plant, native to southern Africa and having largely lily-like reddish or white flowers.
3 *Welt* (Hamburg), 29 December 1995.

CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

There is a myriad of literature available for research. The history of the genocide crisis in Rwanda is the topic of several books focused on the reasons for the disaster.

A great deal of material was available in Germany due to its traditionally good relationship with Rwanda. Dissensbacher’s, *Buergerkrieg und Voelkermord in Ruanda/Ethnischer Klassenkampf und Bevoelkerungswachstum (Civil war and genocide in Rwanda/Ethnical class struggle and population explosion)*, Molt’s, *Die ruandische Tragoedie” (The Rwandan Tragedy)*, and Angelika Spelten’s, *Erfahrungsbericht Ruanda (Experience Report Rwanda)* were excellent reviews of the multiple reasons for the genocide.

The most valuable new research source was the *Le Rapport d’Information N°1271 for the French Assemblee Nationale* with the title *Mission d’information sur le Rwanda* (Information report number 1271 for the French Parliament with the title Information concerning the Rwanda Mission) that examined in great detail the reasons which led to the events in 1994. The report reviews Operation Amaryllis and the subsequent humanitarian intervention, Operation Turquoise. The research focuses on the analysis of the French responsibilities during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

During preparation of Information Report Number 1271, the French parliament conducted several hearings in which the main actors in crisis had to testify regarding their participation. The summary of the records filled more than 400 pages and offered a new insight into the events of 1994. The final report and its summary of record are available on the internet.
The principal source for an account of the actual conduct of Operation Amaryllis was the study “Operation Amaryllis--Fallstudie zum Einsatz französischer Streitkräfte in Ruanda zur Evakuierung von Zivilpersonen” (Operation Amaryllis--case study of the use of French Forces to evacuate non-combatants in Rwanda) carried out by Chef d’escadrons Stephan Uro and the author of this thesis. Excerpts of this research were published in Uwe Hartmann’s “Studien zu Politik, Staat und Gesellschaft in 1999” (Studies of Policy, State and Society).

Another important source for the paper was the author’s visit at the Amt fuer Nachrichtenwesen der Bundeswehr (Federal Armed Forces Intelligence Office). This visit provided valuable background information unavailable from other sources. A new American source is Mel McNulty’s *France’s Rwanda Debacle: the first failure of military intervention in France’s African Domain.* This study provided a critical review of French activities in Rwanda leading up to the genocide in 1994. The study covered the historical development, offered a very detailed description about the different actors and drew new conclusions concerning the French failure to avert the crisis.

Another very useful source for this research was the interview of two officers of the CGSC Class 2000 who were involved in the Rwandan NEO. They added valuable new personnel insights to the events of 1994. Their role in Operation Amaryllis is described in the next chapter.

To understand and to evaluate Operation Amaryllis, several doctrinal manuals that define, outline and describe the French operational procedures and the alert measures are used. These manuals include: “Etude action extérieure 95/sous dossier 2.1.” (*Studies of operations in foreign countries*) and “Les opérations d’ évacuation de ressortissants,
etude action extérieure 95” (Studies of NEOs in foreign countries), published by the French CID (which is the French equivalent to the US CGSC) in 1996.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Odom’s, Leavenworth Paper 14 “Dragon Operations--Hostage Rescues in the Congo,” and “Shaba II: The French and Belgium Intervention in Zaire in 1978” are more general sources used to develop an idea of how to evaluate NEOs. Several additional articles in military newspapers or in the FAS Military Analysis Network serve the same goal.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH

As outlined in chapter 2, one pillar of the research is the case study conducted in 1996 at the Führungsakademie in Hamburg. The French Army severely restricted the results of the finding at that time. The use of any official reference material pertained to the national security interests of France was not allowed. The research in 1996 did not include the names of key players, facts about the special operations, or official critical remarks about what went wrong.

As previously noted, the information available changed to a great degree since 1996. Further official reports published by the French Parliament are now available. The operation has been critically reviewed. The research provides new aspects gained from the evaluation of the records from the hearings. They are the key documents for the second pillar of the research.

The research uses the personal impressions of two officers of the CGSC Class 2000 who were deeply involved in the events of 1994. One is Maj Frederik Derolez, who was the intelligence officer of the Belgian battalion that conducted the evacuation during Operation Silver Back. He provided further valuable information concerning the combined (multinational) aspect of NEOs and revealed discrepancies between the official portrayal of the multinational cooperation by the French General Staff in 1996 and the account of a participant in the operation.

The second officer is Lieutenant Colonel Charles Runigababisha Kayonga, former commander of a Force Patriotiques Ruandaises (FPR) battalion consisting of seven hundred soldiers. His battalion was stationed in Kigali in 1994 and was responsible for
safeguarding the political leaders of the Tutsi minority.\textsuperscript{1} His insight provided this study with the perspective of one of the French opponents. France was traditionally an ally of the Hutu regime in Rwanda. Although the FPR tolerated the French evacuation, it demanded the complete withdrawal of French forces after the end of the NEO. The interviews with these two officers provide the third pillar of this research.

Chapter 4 is the analysis part of this research paper. It is divided into three parts. Part one provides the necessary historical background and the general framework for the understanding of Operation Amaryllis. It is comprised of a portrayal of military geography and a review of the historic developments in Rwanda. Particularly, it is necessary to identify the warning signals of the crisis. To understand the situation that the French evacuation forces were confronted with in 1994, this research paper depicts an assessment of the different civil war factions, including a discussion of their military capabilities. This part of the thesis concludes with a reflection on the evacuees' situation.

Part two of this chapter is a chronological account of the events between 6 April, the day when the Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana was assassinated, and 14 April, the day when the French forces finally concluded the evacuation. This part closes many information gaps from the research of 1996. The newly available sources and the new perspectives provide balance to the French report.

The third and final part of chapter 4 includes the analysis and the evaluation of the French NEO doctrine in 1994 and its execution during Operation Amaryllis. A heuristic approach was used to examine the different aspects of the operation. It was oriented at the various weaknesses that led the German political leadership to cancel a German evacuation attempt in Rwanda in 1994. It gives a brief look at the process of alerting the
French evacuation forces, with a particular focus on command and control (C2) of the organization. The C2 capabilities and the standardized French procedures in an evacuation case are reviewed.

Four operational factors (area, time, forces, and information) are evaluated based on their significance. The thesis looks at the conduct of the NEO from different viewpoints. It analyzes the role of reconnaissance, the collection of intelligence, the role of the Special Forces, the Air Force, and the effectiveness of the logistical and medical support. Special attention is given to the multinational planning process and the combined conduct of the operation between the French and the Belgian Forces.

Finally, the study draws conclusions about the handling of the Western European evacuees, the population, and civil war factions. In addition to these aspects, the investigation of Operation Amaryllis establishes accounts of dealing with the media and effects of psychological stress.

In its fifth and final chapter, the thesis draws general conclusions for the development of a future German NEO capability. It reviews measures undertaken by the German Ministry of Defense between 1994 to 1999 to create force structures that enable the German Army to conduct NEOs. Milestones are the “Einsatzverband Evakuierungsoperationen” (Task Force NEO), followed by the creation of the “Kommando Spezialkraefte” (Special Forces Command). Both concepts are focused on the development of a purely national NEO capability. It is shown how these measures were influenced by the way the French forces conducted Operation Amaryllis in 1994. One link was the author’s aforementioned research written in 1996 at the Fuehrungsakademie in Hamburg, which led to an update of the first draft of German
German Army Forces Command is stationed in Koblenz and commands the Army Forces, in total three corps with 200,000 soldiers in peacetime. When the author of this thesis became G3 Operations Staff Officer for the planning of noncombatant evacuation operations within this command, he was responsible for the continuation of the basic documents. This thesis shows that the lessons learned from the 1994 Rwandan crisis were only partially used during the German NEOs in Albania in 1997 and Eritrea in 1998.

Nevertheless, there is still a need for further refinement. Operation Amaryllis might offer a good approach to this problem. Additionally, procedures to deal with nonmilitary players—the embassy, the evacuees, and the media are other areas that have not been fully developed yet. Finally, this thesis shows that the goal to develop a pure national NEO capability is shortsighted. Procedures to conduct a NEO in a multinational environment remain to be developed.

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This battalion was surrounded by 6,000 soldiers of the Force Armees Ruandaises (FAR), the Army of the Hutu majority. As it is shown later, this strange array of forces was the result of the 1993 Arusha peace treaty. This treaty should have been the hopeful start of the re-democratization process and the reintegration of the Tutsi in Rwanda after a long civil war in the beginning of the 1990s. These hopes were destroyed, however on the evening of the 6 April 1994. LTC Kayonga’s battalion had to fight alone for several days until reinforced by FPR forces attacking from the north.
In the following chapter, the thesis describes in great detail the situation the French evacuation forces faced when they started their decision-making process on 6 April 1994. The question was how to conduct Operation Amaryllis. The key for a successful NEO is a careful assessment of factors that might influence the operation. To use the American terminology, a precise Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is the *conditio sine qua non* for the development of a feasible, acceptable and suitable course of action. To understand the complexity of a NEO scenario, an assessment of the military geography and the possible opponents is required. Furthermore, it is necessary to understand the causes that led to the outbreak of the Rwandan crisis. The historical development of the crisis has to be reviewed in order to understand the behavior of the different factions in a civil war like the Rwandan quagmire in 1994. Additionally, it is important to assess factors that can support the NEO, such as other forces in country (for example UN forces) or friendly belligerents. Finally, the situation of the evacuees has to be reviewed. This chapter reviews in great detail all of these interrelated factors that had to be taken in account by the French evacuation forces during Operation Amaryllis.

Portrayal of Military Geography

**General**

Rwanda is located in the eastern part of Central Africa between the 1st and 3rd southern parallel and the 29th and 31st degree of eastern longitude. Its national territory covers 26,338 square kilometers and is approximately the size of Connecticut. Its
neighboring countries are Uganda in the north, Tanzania in the east, Burundi in the south, and Zaire (today Democratic Republic of Congo) in the west (see figure 1).\textsuperscript{1} Having 294.4 inhabitants per square kilometer, Rwanda is the most densely populated country in Africa.\textsuperscript{2}

**Road Net and Media**

While the road network in Rwanda with an overall length of 12,070 kilometers is one of the densest in Africa, there are only 900 kilometers of roads with all-weather trafficability. Moreover, there are only a few bridges, and the fording sites used for crossing rivers are often untrafficable during rainy season. Therefore, in 1994, the evacuation forces, in their operational planning, had to depend on the main routes of communication from Kigali to the other major cities. Those roads, however, could be easily controlled and blocked by the civil war factions. An evacuation of Europeans exclusively by land would have required the formation of convoys with strong force protection. To do this, it would have been necessary to equip evacuation assets with a great number of vehicles with cross-country capability.

International air traffic relies on the Kayibanda airport in Kanombe-Kigali, which permits the take-off and landing of large-capacity aircraft (see figure 2). After having evaluated the suitability of available airports and airstrips in Rwanda the French evacuation forces decided to use the airport in Kigali.\textsuperscript{3}

Considering that the official languages in Rwanda are Kinyawanda and French, it could have been assumed that the French evacuation forces would have had no problems in communicating with the native population.\textsuperscript{4}
Radio broadcasting services played a major role as an information medium in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{5} Before the civil war, there were about 650,000 radio sets in the country. This was undoubtedly the most widespread and effective form of media in Rwanda, so effective that the Hutu tribe’s broadcasting station, called “Radio Milles Collines,” played a major role in the French operations planning after the French forces became aware that it was the major medium being used for stirring the Hutu against the Tutsi. Logically, this radio station could have also been used to create a hostile attitude among the population against the French evacuation forces. It was therefore necessary to keep it under very careful surveillance and to come up with a contingency plan for its neutralization.

\textbf{The Kigali Area}

The capital of Kigali covers an area of 115 square kilometers (see figure 3). In 1962, the year Rwanda gained its independence, the new government started upgrading the infrastructure of Kigali so as to meet the requirements of a nation’s capital. Besides setting up new administration buildings, arrangements were made to establish medium-size industries in the city. The major streets and roads were given an asphalt surface.\textsuperscript{6} The Kayibanda international airport was established at Kanombe, about 7 kilometer east of downtown.\textsuperscript{7} It is accessible by two connecting roads:

The southern route (figure 3, 1) runs through the city district of Gikondo. This area is where mainly medium-sized corporations and industries have been established and is characterized by larger buildings and wider roads. The open area would have made it easy for evacuation forces to detect and counter any attempts to block or to ambush a convoy.
The northern route (figure 3, 2) runs north of camp Kimhurura, passing a barracks compound of the Rwandan army. Regular military forces could have protected it. When riots broke out before the French operation got underway, the northern route immediately formed the frontline facing the 3rd Battalion of the FPR. This is the battalion that was commanded by the aforementioned LTC Kayonga. As shown later, this battalion was stationed at the Kimhurura Hill around the Hotel Méridien (figure 3, 3). The preservation of this battalion was the main reason for preferring the southern route running through Gikondo for conducting an evacuation from the downtown area to the airport.

Both routes join in the Nyakabanda city district just before the airport. Nyakabanda is one of the so-called spontaneous settlements that describes the unplanned urban development of this city district in the sixties and seventies. Narrow streets and alleys with tiny houses characterize this part of Kigali. Therefore, the area of Nyakabanda poses a permanent threat for evacuation convoys and has to be driven through at high speed.

A similar threat for evacuation forces, narrow streets, exists in the downtown area. "It hardly differs from those of other big cities in Africa. Two-to three-story apartment houses are flanking the streets which are mostly too narrow and whose hustle and bustle during peacetime would fascinate any European." During the civil war, enemy forces of minimal strength could have easily blocked those streets and prevented evacuation convoy operations. Due to the permanent threat of small arms fire against transport vehicles, operations planning might have called for employment of armored vehicles. Yet, the French forces conducted their operation intentionally without using armored vehicles. The reason for this decision is explained later in this chapter.
When hostilities broke out, French forces were in control of three buildings: the French Embassy (figure 3, 4), the French high school Saint-Exupéry located near the Rwandan army headquarters (figure 3, 5), and the French Cultural Center in the north of the downtown area (figure 3, 6). Given adequate protection by military forces, these three buildings offered the possibility to marshal evacuees as a first step and then to transfer evacuees with protected convoys to the airport.

Historical Development

While it is argued that most African countries are artificial creations of European colonialism, this is not the case with Rwanda. Rwanda, similar to its neighboring country Burundi, has historical roots as kingdoms in the last centuries. Conflicts between the Hutu and the Tutsi started as early as the fifteenth century. The Bantu-speaking Hutu would burn down forest areas on the so-called thousand hills of Rwanda to make them fit for cultivation. In this process, the Hutu pushed back the original population, Batwa tribe, who were hunters and gatherers. Being sedentary farmers, the Hutu would organize in large family groups, clans, and even small kingdoms. Assumed to have come from the highlands of what is today Ethiopia, the Nilotic Tutsi or Batutsi, in search of new pastures for their cattle, migrated into the area of what is today Rwanda and Burundi.

During the next centuries, the Tutsi established a system of feudal rule over the Hutu. The Tutsi were warriors, and the Hutu served them as share croppers, farm workers, tenants, and cattle herders. From 1890 to 1916, the country came under German colonial influence. In 1921, Rwanda was handed over to Belgium under the mandate of the Alliance of Nations. The Belgian colonial administration systems continued to rely on the traditional rule structures. Although the Tutsi aristocracy lost some of its formal
power, it was at the same time able to strengthen its leading role economically and socially.\textsuperscript{11} The Tutsi had privileged access to the state administration, to key positions in the economic sector, and to educational institutions.

A new intellectual Hutu elite challenged this privileged role in the 1940s, after the Belgian colonial administration had reformed the education system in a way that offered the Hutu better access to educational institutions.

In 1957, a group of Hutu intellectuals published the Bahutu manifest demanding an end of Tutsi rule and improved access to key economic and political positions.\textsuperscript{12}

The ensuing riots developed into an open rebellion in 1959 after a Hutu leader had been assassinated by the Tutsi elite. The first massacres of Tutsi occurred in this year and even the intervention of Belgian paratroopers could not save the regime. The Tutsi king fled into neighboring Burundi and Uganda along with 150,000 to 200,000 of his supporters.\textsuperscript{13}

After this first civil war, a monarchy was abolished through plebiscite. The Hutu staged a coup d'état in January 1961, proclaiming Rwanda to be a free republic. Rwanda gained its independence on 1 July 1962 under its first President Kayibanda, a Hutu. After a non-violent revolt in 1973, Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, also Hutu, seized power, supporting himself on the dominating influence of the Hutu people living in the north of Rwanda.\textsuperscript{14}

In the 1980s Rwanda went through a phase of economic boom. For a while, it was considered the Switzerland of Africa. While poor and densely populated, Rwanda was nevertheless politically stable.\textsuperscript{15} Rwanda became a priority recipient of foreign aid for economic development in this part of Africa.\textsuperscript{16} Despite some acts of violence against
Tutsi, they were not subjected to discrimination under the authoritarian and autocratic regime of Habyarimana. However, the Tutsi people who fled in 1960 were not allowed to return.

In 1989 after the slump of prices for coffee and tea on the world market, accompanied by a reduction of the high influx of foreign loans, Rwanda was stricken with famine for the first time in its history, creating nationwide riots that resembled civil war.

In 1990, Rwanda was on the verge of bankruptcy. On 1 September, the FPR, the rebel army dominated by Tutsi exiles, launched an attack from Uganda. Colonel Alexis Kanyerengwe had founded the FPR in 1987 in Uganda. Many of the FPR soldiers had fought in 1986 for the rebel army of the Ugandan President Musevini. This helps to explain the support the FPR received from Uganda. The FPR attack could only be stopped with the support of Belgian and French paratroopers, as well as additional forces from former Zaire. Giving in to international pressure, Habyarimana in 1991 introduced a multi-party system. He also yielded to the demand that human rights be respected. The newly developing parties were quickly able to rally significant support.

Nevertheless, the civil war continued. In early summer 1992, the FPR was able to conquer a strip of land about 20 kilometers wide in the north of the country. An armistice was concluded on 12 July 1992. It was monitored by a group of observers from the Organization of African Nations (OAU), who controlled a Zone of Separation 15 kilometers wide. After the UN with its observer mission United Nations Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) had instituted a verification system, the purpose of which was to prevent smuggling of war materiel from Uganda, the warring factions signed the
Peace Agreement of Arusha (Tanzania) on 4 August 1993. This voluminous agreement laid down an arrangement of power sharing between government parties and opposition parties. It also contained arrangements for the return of refugees. With this agreement, the FPR was promoted to the status of a legal party.

Habyarimana and his supporters, however, did not really intend to establish the agreed interim government or to allow their unlimited power to be restricted by a functioning multi-party system. In fact, the Arusha agreement did not promote or facilitate the process of democratization. Instead, it merely served as a compromise for power sharing which involved great risks for a new conflict.

The UN Security Council, in its resolution of 5 October 1993, decided to create the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), which was to monitor the implementation of the Arusha agreement.

In spring 1994, Habyarimana, on several occasions, failed to comply with initiatives of the UN and the opposition parties aimed at instituting the interim government. A tense atmosphere of instability, violence, crime and paranoia prevailed in the country. A simple spark was enough to ignite this powder keg.

Warning Signals

There were numerous warning signals suggesting that hostilities might break out at any time. By late 1993, French intelligence sources had learned that Hutu radicals had made concrete plans to murder some members of their own tribe and then blame those murders on the Tutsi dominated FPR. Hutu hard-liners felt that too many concessions had been made under international pressures, and that the position of the FPR had been strengthened to a disproportionate extent. The paramilitary Hutu militias
INTERHAMWE and IMPUZAMUGAMBI, who were systematically trained in Rwandan military camps, compounded the instability. During the civil war, those militias would display great cruelty and brutality.\(^{33}\)

Another indication that a genocide was being prepared by the Habyarimana regime was the deliberate and organized assassination of some key opposition party figures in spring 1994.\(^{34}\) According to intelligence sources, there were prepared lists of Tutsi targeted for liquidation.

The Kigali Area

General

When combat activities broke out on 6 April 1994, the military and paramilitary forces on the government side totaled some 39,000 men. Those forces were opposed on the FPR side by about 15,000 fighters and 5,000 men assigned to command and service support elements. Most of the military forces of both factions were deployed in northern Rwanda along the line of demarcation established on 12 July 1992. Habyarimana had concentrated some 7,000 men in the Kigali area.

Since the Arusha peace agreement, the FPR 3rd Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles Kayonga, had been stationed around the parliament building in the hilly terrain northeast of Kigali. Its mission was to ensure the protection of FPR politicians attending negotiations in the National Assembly. The unit was a light infantry battalion equipped with rifles, mortars, and RPGs.\(^{35}\)

The Rwandan Army (Forces Armées Ruandaises (FAR)) was deployed in seven positions along the line of demarcation in the north of the country. A total of some 18,700 soldiers were deployed there. Most of the Rwandan soldiers had completed just
two months of training. The only first-class forces, the scarce elite units, the Presidential
Guard (Garde Présidentielle (GP)) of about 600 men, and one battalion of paratroopers
were deployed in downtown Kigali and at the Kayibanda airport.

In terms of armament, morale, and discipline, the FPR was far superior to the
FAR forces.\textsuperscript{36} In addition, they were reinforced by some additional 1,000 members of
the Ugandan armed forces under the command of Colonel Kerim.

An important aspect of the planning of the French evacuation operation was that
the civil war factions were employing antipersonnel and antitank mines randomly without
a systematic pattern.\textsuperscript{37} Moreover, both factions had weapons with an antiair-artillery
(\textit{AAA}) capability, which presented a constant threat to rescue and transport flights. In
order to counter the threat to transport flights, French planners would have to provide for
a capability of suppressing such weapon systems. The planners also would have to
provide a limited counter-mine capability.

\textbf{Government Forces in the Kigali Area (FAR)}

Figure 4 gives an overview of the presumed positioning, strength, and armament
of military and paramilitary forces in Kigali based on an estimate of the situation
conducted in April 1994 by the German Amt fuer Nachrichtenwesen (Federal Armed
Forces Intelligence Office).\textsuperscript{38} Lieutenant Colonel Charles Kayonga during his interview
confirmed this employment of the government forces.\textsuperscript{39}

In principle, the French evacuation forces could have expected that initially the
FAR would not take a hostile attitude toward them. French military advisers of the
AMT, which provided military and technical assistance to the FAR, had a substantial
influence on some key units, including the paratrooper battalion responsible for the
protection of the airport. In the preparatory planning, it could have been assumed that the FAR would have made vehicles available to the evacuation forces. On the other hand, the FAR would have assumed that French forces, just as in 1990 and 1992, would again be on their side and help them oppose the FPR. If the FAR had realized that France would not support their fight, their disappointment could have changed their attitude towards the evacuation forces. Especially at the time of the French withdrawal, the FAR would have become a risk factor. It is shown later in this paper, that FAR forces for example tried to prevent the take-off of the last French airplane by firing mortar rounds on the airfield. Due to this potential threat in the last phase of the operation, it was necessary to make early plans so that the redeployment of the evacuation task force would be screened and protected by appropriate forces and assets.

**Forces of the Ruanda Patriotic Front (FPR) in the Kigali Area**

When fighting broke out on 6 April 1994, the previously mentioned FPR 3rd battalion, with its 600 soldiers, was the only rebel military unit in the Kigali area. That battalion had taken up positions in the hill terrain northeast of Kigali and was able to deliver tracked mortar fire on the Kanombe-Kigali airport. Beginning 7 April, elements up to battalion strength infiltrated FAR defense lines along the line of demarcation with the intention of bringing quick reinforcement to the isolated FPR units in Kigali.

Based on the French assessment of the opposing factions, the FPR battalion deployed in its strongpoint in the northwestern part of the city was initially not seen as a threat because the plan was to use the southern route between the airport and the city center.
UN Forces in the Kigali Area

Once the massacres began, UN forces withdrew to their bases in Kigali. The Belgian battalion dispersed throughout the major area of Kigali and, as such, was totally fragmented. Its subunits were isolated. The Belgian force was also demoralized by the knowledge that ten Belgian blue-helmet soldiers, employed for the protection of the Rwandan Prime minister, had been murdered. It was no longer possible for the Belgian battalion to take effective action at the company or battalion level. Members of the African UNAMIR units used the land routes to flee into neighboring countries. Thus, UNAMIR was also unable to take effective action. It did not appear practical for the French concept of operations to count on an active role for those forces.

Additional Information On The Situation

When the planning began, the French evacuation forces had very little information about the situation on 7 April 1994. That night in the French Embassy, sporadic small arms and larger caliber weapons fire could be heard in various parts of Kigali. Word of the deaths of the Belgian UNAMIR mission soldiers came on 8 April 1994. It was also discovered that two French gendarmes and the wife of one of them were missing. It was feared that they had been murdered.

This bad situation was compounded by news that moderate Hutu and Tutsi politicians had also been slaughtered. The thing to do was to obtain additional information quickly to get a clearer picture of the situation by drawing on available civilian and military sources.
Evacuee Situation

All in all, there were about 3,500 European and North American citizens in Rwanda, including some 1,500 Belgians, 550 French (see figure 5), 350 Germans, 255 Americans, 198 Italians, about 100 British, 200 Canadians, 175 Swiss, 135 Spaniards, and about 100 Dutch.\(^5\) The majority of French evacuees lived in Kigali.\(^51\) Although evacuation plans had been developed as early as December 1993, it was very difficult to get a clear picture of the situation of the foreign nationals.\(^\) Apart from some vague information provided by the French Embassy and some non-governmental organizations (NGOs), some of the trapped nationals could be contacted by telephone until 9 April. After that, the telephone network broke down all over Rwanda.\(^53\)

The French Cooperation Minister Michel Roussin portrayed the evacuee situation in his statement on 9 April 1994 as: "They (the French in Kigali) are living under very difficult conditions. They have withdrawn into the hallways of their homes, taking cover behind mattresses. There is no electricity or water. We will have to get them out of there with protected convoys, family by family."\(^54\)

Quite a few of the French citizens would become eyewitnesses of massacres.\(^55\) Inside the buildings of some relief organizations, enraged militiamen slaughtered Rwandan employees. It was feared that the victims of those clashes would include a number of Europeans.\(^56\) Moreover, some fifty high-ranking Rwandan politicians and their families had taken refuge inside the French Embassy, while 200 others fled into the US Embassy.\(^57\)
Assessment of the Opposing Factions/Civil War Factions

Although the 500 French soldiers who had intervened in September 1992 had been withdrawn after the arrival of the UNAMIR multinational peacekeeping force in December 1993, France continued to support Habyarimana and his Hutu parties with military assistance.\(^{58}\)

In terms of strength and equipment, the UNAMIR contingent was too weak to guarantee the safety of the foreign nationals in Rwanda. Also, the UNAMIR quickly lost credibility. The Hutu started hoping for a return of the French who had up to then been the only stabilizing power recognized in Rwanda.\(^{59}\) The Belgian Blue-helmet soldiers were accused of unilaterally cooperating with the FPR.\(^{60}\) The great hopes initially vested in the peacekeepers eventually changed to open hostilities. This change led to a paradox situation for subsequent French-Belgian planning. Initially, the French evacuation forces did not have to plan for any direct threat from the Hutu population. Such a threat came primarily from the FPR rebels who, prior to the operation, had repeatedly accused France of open collaboration with the Habyarimana government. The Belgian’s situation was just the opposite. After they had escorted the FPR battalion of Lieutenant Colonel Kayonga to Kigali in spring 1994, they encountered open hostility from the Hutu population. The FPR, on the other hand, was friendly to them.\(^{61}\)

This dilemma was the delicate and tricky part of the planning of this multinational evacuation operation. It was necessary to coordinate in great detail how to handle the problem. During the quickly developing joint planning effort of the Belgians and the French, their planners had to find an early answer to the question of who would take action where and who would be best suited for which job.\(^{62}\)
Furthermore, despite the apparently good relations between the French and the Hutu, French planners were perfectly aware of the fact that these bonds of friendship might quickly snap once the Hutu realized that France was exclusively concerned with the evacuation of its own citizens and that the Hutu could not hope for reinforcements as in 1990 and 1992.

**Operation Amaryllis—The Conduct Of The Evacuation Operation**

The following chapter describes the events which took place between 6 April and 14 April 1994. It reviews the actions of the French evacuation forces in order to gain insights for aspects that should be assessed in greater detail to develop the lessons learned from the operation. This chapter comprises only the facts, while the evaluation of Operation Amaryllis and the French NEO doctrine in 1994 follows in the next chapter.

**6 April 1994**

On 6 April 1994, at about 8:00 p.m. the plane of the Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana was shot down with a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile as the airplane approached Kigali. Also on the plane were the Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira, the commander of the presidential guards, Colonel Sagattwa, and the Chief of the Rwandan General Staff. All passengers aboard the plane were killed, as were the three French crewmen.

Immediately after this incident, the Hutu started the genocide. The hospitals in Kigali were quickly overwhelmed with wounded Tutsi, 800,000 of whom would be killed over the next several weeks.
Thirty minutes after the assassination, French Ambassador Jean Michel Marlaud informed the French Foreign Ministry about the incident and, because he feared a deterioration of the situation in Kigali, suggested preparations for a NEO. At 9:00 p.m., only one hour after the plane crash, the Etat-Major des Armées (EMA), the French General Staff, transmitted an alert message by telephone to the following combat units, ordering them to be prepared to conduct a NEO in Rwanda (figure 6):

1. In Bangui (Republic of Central Africa), one company of paratroopers, one tactical command element, and two Transall C-160, stationed at Bouar, which is also in Central Africa;

2. In Libreville, one company of paratroopers and two Transall C-160; and

3. In Biarritz (France), a Special Forces Unit from the French Special Forces Command (Commandement Opérations Spéciales (COS)) ready to deploy with one C-130.

To enhance short-notice deployment readiness, the units that were stationed in Bangui possessed an extra set of prepositioned material and equipment; they did not have to rely on their training assets. Additionally, the military advisers of the “Assistance Militaire Technique” (AMT) in Rwanda were alerted, and a crisis management cell was established at the Mission d’Assistance Militaire (MAM), which was the advisory and coordination staff at the French Embassy in Kigali.

At midnight, the commander of the “Eléments Français d’Assistance Opérationnelle” (COMEFAO) gave the first situation briefing for his staff. The COMEFAO is the joint commander of the French forces in Africa. His briefing marked the beginning of preparations and planning considerations for a possible evacuation. This
staff operating from Bangui exercised interservice command and control of French forces in Africa, except for those stationed in Djibouti.  

April 6, 1994 was characterized by the immediate triggering of alarm measures. The fact that prepositioned forces were available in Africa and that, with the COMEFEO, a Command and Control structure for a NEO was already established were crucial for the quick reaction of the French forces. These facts are reviewed in more detail in the chapter covering the assessment of the operation.

7 April 1994

Around 1:30 a.m. on 7 April, a written order confirming the alert measures was issued by the COIA, the command and control cell of the French General Staff.

During the night, the alerted French forces in Central Africa that were committed to guarding and protection missions, were replaced by other units. The French Foreign Ministry contacted Ambassador Marlaud in Kigali to confirm again the necessity for a NEO. France considered an intervention ahead of Belgian commando forces. The French soldiers of the AMT already in Kigali received the mission to guarantee the security of the ambassador’s residence and the embassy (see figure 7, 1). At the same time, France offered asylum for Habyarimana’s relatives. The response of Ambassador Marlaud came promptly. He urgently requested the conduct of a NEO. He estimated the situation in Kigali as follows:

1. Neither the UNAMIR forces nor the Rwandan gendarmerie under the command of General Ndindiliyimana nor the Rwandan Army under command of the new
Chief of the army, Colonel Gatzini, were able to guarantee the safety of European citizens;

2. The available AMT forces could secure only the French Embassy.\textsuperscript{68}

During the day, more and more acts of violence were committed in Kigali. A Belgian squad of blue-helmet soldiers employed for the protection of the Rwandan Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana were disarmed, tortured, and murdered by members of the FAR.

At that time, reliable information indicated that FAR forces were in control of the Kanombe-Kigali airport, and that they had closed the runway (see figure 7, 2). The MAM instructed French citizens living in Ruhengeri and Gisenyi to evacuate themselves to Zaire by road.

The FPR Battalion had moved out of the compound of the parliament building at 0230 hours and had prepared defensive positions along the northern route to downtown Kigali (see figure 7, 3). During the day, the FPR rebels defended very efficiently out of these positions against attacking regular Army forces (see figure 7, 4).\textsuperscript{69}

Between 11:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m., the French President Francois Mitterand was briefed on the current situation by Admiral Lanxade, the “Chef d’Etat-Major des Armées (CEMA)” (comparable to the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). President Mitterand made the decision in principle that an evacuation operation had to be carried out. At the political level, a “cellule de crise interministerielle” (inter-ministerial crisis management cell), consisting of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Cooperation, and the Minister of Defense, was established for the purpose of coordinating further courses of action.
At 5:00 p.m., the COIA began to develop plans and orders for an operation to evacuate French nationals from Rwanda. This operation was named Operation Amaryllis.

Meanwhile in Africa, Colonel Poncet and his staff arrived in Bangui. He was the commander of the “3ème Régiment Parachutiste d'Infanterie de Marine” (RPIMa = 3rd Marine Paratroop Regiment), and he would subsequently be in command of the evacuation task force which was to be constituted.

At 10:30 p.m., the COIA gave orders by teletype for the COMEFAO to initiate practical preparations for the evacuation of French citizens from Kigali.70

April 7, 1994 was characterized by the planning process in the military hierarchy. Hence, the inter-departmental cooperation and the available Command and Control means are evaluated in more detail in the next chapter.

8 April 1994

On Friday, 8 April 1994, the situation deteriorated. The FPR had served notice that it would no longer comply with the armistice stipulated by the Arusha peace accord, and FPR forces advanced towards the Rwandan capital.

At the same time, two French gendarmes, the Adjudants-Chefs Maier and Didot of the AMT, and Didot’s wife, were killed in the city district of Kacyru in the northern part of Kigali (see figure 8, 1). The French Embassy received news of the killings from the director of the Hotel Méridien via radio transmission. Both Adjudant-Chefs belonged to the group of twenty-four soldiers of the AMT who had stayed in Rwanda after the retreat of French forces in the December of 1993. The loss of these two noncommissioned officers, who were the radio communications specialists of the French Embassy, was
critical because nobody else could operate the INMARSAT equipment. It was assumed that the reason for the murders was because of the radio relay station that had been installed by Didot in his house to improve the range of his radio equipment. The killers were presumed to be members of the FPR. The death of the three increased the number of the total French losses to six.

In the meantime in Europe, following a process of coordination between the director of COIA and the Belgian general staff headed by General Charlier, the Chairman of the Belgian Joint Chiefs of Staff in Brussels, both nations decided to carry out a combined operation. The French forces were to take control of the Kanombe-Kigali airport and secure it. The Belgian forces were to provide reinforcements.

During the late morning hours, the French AMT advisers of the Rwandan paratroop battalion were able to clear the runway of the international airport at Kanombe-Kigali (see figure 8, 2).

At 5:00 p.m. orders by telephone were received at Bangui calling for the employment of the tactical command element under Colonel Poncet that had already been alerted, as well as one paratrooper company. The evacuation was to get underway immediately. Bangui was designated as the rear base.

At 7:45 p.m., the go-ahead was given for the implementation of the airlift concept, which had been developed in the meantime.

By 9:00 p.m., the first four C-160 aircraft took off from the Bangui airport heading for Kigali. They carried the mobile command post of 3eme RPIMa, the CEA (Compagnie d'Eclaireage et d'Appui - reconnaissance and combat support company) of the Regiment, and one long-range reconnaissance patrol of 13eme RDP (Régiment de
Dragons Parachutistes (Dragoon Paratroop Regiment, long range reconnaissance regiment)). The special equipment they carried consisted of two INMARSAT systems and 2 P4 jeeps serving as command vehicles.

Around 10:35 p.m., the rear base at Bangui informed Paris that the evacuation forces were ready to begin the operation.

At 11:10 p.m., 3rd Company of 8eme RPIMa arrived at Bangui to provide additional reinforcement. This company came from Libreville in Gabon.

Around 11:30 p.m., the COIA in Paris issued the operation order to carry out Operation Amaryllis. The objectives of Amaryllis were:

1. Preparation of a French noncombatant evacuation operation;
2. Seizure and control of the facilities of the international airport in Kigali; and
3. Be prepared, if the circumstances allow it, to evacuate immediately sixty persons chosen by the French Ambassador.\(^{75}\)

The last objective was intended for the family members of Habyarimana. Along with the operation order, Colonel Poncet was provided a set of rules of engagement (ROE). The French forces had to maintain strict neutrality between the belligerents and were ordered to act in a discrete manner. The use of deadly force was strictly limited to self-defense of the evacuation forces and to the defense of persons under French protection.\(^{76}\)

The timing of the COIA’s operation order was remarkable because by then the aircraft carrying the first echelon had already been up in the air for three hours. This meant that the task force commander, Colonel Poncet, had accepted the risk that the operation might have been aborted. On the other hand, this decision permitted him to
gain four hours of flying time in the event that the operation was approved by the COIA in Paris.

The same order directed that Colonel Bernard Cussac, on vacation in France, would resume his function as the French defense attaché upon his arrival in Kigali. Colonel Poncet was declared the “commandant d’opération” (COMOPS). The personnel of the AMT would be assigned under his command.  

April 8, 1994 is the day when the assessment of the belligerents in Rwanda was completed by the French forces. The evacuation forces for the operation were determined. At the same time, the multinational planning process between France and Belgium started. These three aspects are assessed in more detail in the following chapter.

9 April 1994

At 12:30 a.m. a second echelon was deployed from Bangui via a C-160. This echelon carried a platoon of paratroopers and an air-mobile medical clearing station called “demi-antenne chirurgicale parachutiste (ACP).” This medical package also had the capability to perform minor surgery.

The first echelon reached Kigali at 12:55 a.m. (see figure 9,1). For security reasons, the entire flight was flown without using position lights. In addition, radio silence had been imposed. The sources available do not specify whether or not and to what extent countries that had been over-flown, especially Zaire, had been informed on the overall operation and the flight route. Radio contact with the Kanombe-Kigali airport control tower was not established until close to the airport. A French AMT officer standing by at the airport reported that the runway had been cleared. He himself had driven a blocking truck from the runway. If the runway had not been cleared, the
operation plan provided for the task force to be parachuted on a military training area 2 km north of Kanombe (see figure 9, 2). This would have meant that the four airplanes would have had to return to Bangui to pick up the parachutes.

At 1:10 a.m., the four C-160s of the contingent conducted a tactical landing operation (see figure 9, 3). Every thirty seconds an airplane landed, unloaded, and took off immediately. One C-160 stayed on the airport. While the CEA forces were securing the airport and its surroundings, the task force set up its command post in the transit building. Fifteen minutes after the first plane had touched down, the airport was under French control. There was no resistance. The radio equipment of the long-range reconnaissance patrol was used to make initial contact with Bangui.

At 2:00 a.m., a C-130 of the COS, carrying thirty-five soldiers, two P4 jeeps, and two tons of equipment arrived at Bangui. This unit came directly from Biarritz in France. Its C-130 was especially equipped and tailored for special operations.

At 4:30 a.m., the fifth C-160 of the second echelon landed with an additional forty soldiers including a MILAN (French-German Antitank missile) squad (see figure 9, 4).

The task force commander, Colonel Poncet, personally contacted the French Embassy located in downtown Kigali at 5:00 a.m. (see figure 9, 5). In doing so, he was protected by rangers organic to the Regiment. Those ranger elements were known as CRAP (Commandos de Recherche et d’Action dans la Profondeur). This link-up went hand in hand with a reconnaissance effort focused on the routes of communication between the Kanobe-Kigali airport and the planned evacuee marshaling points (the French Embassy and the French Saint-Exupéry school). The second echelon infantry platoon, having landed at 4:30 a.m., was immediately employed for the protection of
those two marshaling points. There were no combat activities throughout the first two landing phases.

During the day, the French ambassador in Kigali informed Ugandan President Yoweri Musewi of the intent of Operation Amaryllis and requested that he convince the FPR leadership in Uganda of the strict humanitarian and neutral character of the operation.

During the afternoon, the French evacuation forces established control over the French Embassy and the French school (see figure 9, 6). They started to evacuate French citizens living in the center of Kigali and the southern outskirts (see figure 9, 7).

At 4:15 p.m., the COIA granted authorization for an additional company to be employed. This was a change in the initial OPLAN, which had only foreseen a total deployment of two companies. This additional company would leave Bangui at 6:00 p.m.

In the meantime, in Kigali, a C-160 took off at 5:00 p.m. with the first fifty-five evacuees who had arrived at the airport one hour before. On board were twelve members of the Habyarimana clan and forty-three French citizens (see figure 9, 8).

Shortly thereafter, a third echelon with additional reinforcements arrived. Those were the COS forces and assets previously mentioned (see figure 9, 9).

At 9:55 p.m. the COIA in Paris had decided to shorten command channels. The overall responsibility for Operation Amaryllis was transferred from the COMEFAO to Colonel Poncet, who became the COMOPS. The respective orders (L’ordre de conduite n° 1) was given at 10:59 p.m. This order also attached the AMT soldiers under his
command. In Kigali, Colonel Cussach returned and took over his function as French military attaché again. L’ordre de conduite n°.1 did not change the ROE.

Shortly before midnight, the reinforcing company, 128 soldiers of the 3eme RPIMA originally stationed in Bouar, arrived in Kigali (see figure 9, 10). Colonel Poncet now had 359 French soldiers available in Rwanda.83

April 9, 1994 was the day when the evacuation forces entered Rwanda. Reconnaissance was conducted. Central Africa became the turntable for the deployment of the NEO-force. The personnel and material readiness measures of the French forces had paid off. The four operational factors of time, area, forces and information were linked together. Due to the lack of information in the area (Africa), available forces (pre-positioned forces) were deployed in order to gain the necessary time to conduct the NEO quickly. All of these aspects are examined in more detail in the assessment of Operation Amaryllis in the next chapter.

10 April 1994

In the morning, another plane took off carrying Frenchmen, Americans and one German evacuee to Bujumbura in Burundi.

Around 10:00 a.m., the friendly situation was as follows (see figure 10, 1): the Kanombe-Kigali airport and its surroundings were under the protection of 3rd Company, 8eme RPIMA. At the airport, the task force headquarters, the evacuation center, and the ACP were established. The evacuation center was a standard organization that handled the arrival of the evacuees, their registration, their supply, and their clearance for departure. In the center of the city, one platoon of paratroopers had established a defensive position in the French Embassy. In the French high school, one platoon of
paratroopers took charge of the evacuees and transported them to the airport. In the north of the city, the CEA platoon protected the cultural center and marshaled French citizens willing to be evacuated. Moreover, it maintained control of the vital road junction where the northern lines of communication converged. The most dangerous mission was assigned to the COS elements (see figure 10, 2). They were the ones designated to take control of the residential areas of those foreigners who, due to the threat situation, could not reach the marshaling points unless adequately protected.

Additional reinforcements arrived at 11:15 a.m.. One company of 8eme RPIMa, normally stationed in Libreville, was flown in. This company was reinforced by one airborne artillery platoon of 35th Airborne Artillery Regiment (35th RAP) (see figure 10, 3). It should be noted that this platoon had also been deliberately organized and employed as an infantry platoon. At this time, the combat task force had a total of three companies in Kigali. These new reinforcements increased the number of French forces to 464.

Additional forces were deployed from France, with a civilian Airbus A-310 flying them to Bangui and N’djamena (Chad). This meant that at least one additional paratrooper company was standing by as a reserve force. The deployment of a C-135 FR refueling aircraft provided the capability to employ Jaguars and Mirage F1s stationed in Africa to conduct close air support.

By the end of the day, a total of 493 civilians (including nine Germans) were flown out and taken to Bujumbura and Bangui. From Bangui, the first Airbus took off at 3:10 p.m., airlifting the first 203 evacuees back to France (see figure 10, 4).
The FPR had continued with its attack against the capital and the equivalent of two FPR battalions reached the northern outskirts of Kigali.\textsuperscript{84} Lieutenant Colonel Kayonga had moved his FPR forces South in order to cut off the airport. In his interview he stated: "Our aim was to keep the enemy busy, until our reinforcements would arrive (see figure 10, 5)."\textsuperscript{85}

Due to the development of the situation, at 3:30 p.m. the French ambassador proposed in a telephone call to the French Foreign Ministry to set 12 April as the date for the closure of the embassy.\textsuperscript{86}

Also during the afternoon, Belgian paratroopers and commando forces arrived in two echelons. Each echelon consisted of four C-130 with a total of 240 soldiers. A total of five lightly armored vehicles and one medical clearing station were also brought along (see figure 10, 6).\textsuperscript{87} Colonel Poncet had arranged an agreement with the commander of the Rwandan paratrooper battalion that no one would fire on the arriving Belgian airplanes. Nevertheless, Poncet placed French soldiers near every anti-air gun. Each had the mission to fire on any Rwandan soldier who tried to shoot at the landing planes.\textsuperscript{88}

Finally, during the afternoon, COS elements carried out a spectacular operation that would receive much praise in the international press coverage.\textsuperscript{89} COS elements evacuated ninety-seven children from the French orphanage at Masaka (ten kilometers south of Kigali).\textsuperscript{90}

At 9:22 p.m., the task force received the "l'ordre de conduite n°. 2" from the COIA in Paris. This order comprised intelligence updates concerning the progress of the FPR forces approaching from the North. It did not change the mission, the ROEs or the chain of command.\textsuperscript{91}
April 10, 1994 was characterized by the arrival of the Belgian evacuation forces and by the evacuation of a large number of French citizens. The multinational cooperation on the tactical level, the handling of the evacuees, and the role of the French Air Force that carried the major burden of the NEO on 10 April 1994 are reviewed in the assessment of the operation in the next chapter.

11 April 1994

At 12:30 a.m., the task force transmitted a situational update to the superior command level concerning the progress of the operation. As the day wore on, the situation deteriorated from the French viewpoint due to the progress of the FPR approaching from the north.

The FPR main forces meanwhile had advanced within ten kilometers of the northern outskirts of the capital. The FPR 3rd Battalion reached the southern evacuation route (see figure 11, 1).92

Picking up isolated foreigners became more and more difficult in Kigali. The fact that on that day the evacuation had exclusively been conducted by way of Bujumbura leads to the conclusion that the French must have had decided to evacuate people by taking the shortest route. It took one hour and forty minutes for the round trip flight Kigali-Bujumbura-Kigali. There were 327 civilians, among them five Germans were evacuated on five flights conducted that day (see figure 11, 2).

Additional military contingents arrived at Kigali, including one Belgian Infantry Company plus Italian paratroopers in company-strength (see figure 11, 3).

At 8:12 p.m., “ordre de conduite n° 3” (order No. 3) was issued by the COIA. It contained initial instructions for the withdrawal of the French forces and called
specifically for the evacuation of the French Embassy. It was remarkable that the order addressed the embassy personnel in general and did not differentiate between French and Rwandan employees.93

April 11, 1994 was the day when the advance of the FPR forces changed the military situation in Kigali. The French reacted to this new threat by using the media as a means to convince the Tutsi of the neutral character of the French NEO force. The role of the media in general is reviewed in the chapter concerning the evaluation of Operation Amaryllis.

12 April 1994

On this day, the hill terrain north of Kigali was captured by FPR spearheads, FPR forces also infiltrated the terrain south of the airport. Their task was to encircle the airport (see figure 12, 1).94 A representative of the FPR in Paris announced an ultimatum that the French evacuation forces had to leave Kigali within the next sixty hours, which meant not later than 15 April 1994.95

During the early morning hours, the French Embassy was closed down, and the remaining embassy personnel, its material, and the bodies of the killed French pilots were evacuated by two C-160 at 7:30 a.m. (see figure 12,2).96 The bodies of the murdered gendarmes were found buried in Didot’s backyard (see figure 12,3).97

All in all, French forces would evacuate 241 civilians during the day, most of them Rwandans and employees of the UNAMIR, to Bujumbura on four flights. Only the employees of the French Embassy were evacuated directly to Bangui (see figure 12, 4).

Another major event that day was the relief of French protection elements by the newly arrived Belgian paratroopers and elements of the Belgian UNAMIR battalion. In
this context, the first transfer of responsibility concerned the marshalling point in the French school (see figure 12, 5).

It appears that 3rd Company of 8ème RPIMa was being relieved from its protective function at the airport by those French forces that were now available to assume new tasks. The 3rd company flew back to Bangui at about 2:00 p.m. (see figure 12, 6).

By the evening, all French evacuation forces were gathered around the Kanombe-Kigali airport (see figure 12, 7). At 10:47 p.m., l'ordre de conduite n°. Four issued by the COIA was received in Kigali. This order contained specific instructions for the withdrawal of the French evacuation forces. While Colonel Poncelet was still in charge of the operation, the detachment of the COS (Special Forces) under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Jean-Jacques Maurin was now directly attached under the command of the chief of general staff. The reason for this change in the command structure was that, according to the evacuation plan, the COS would be the last to leave Kigali.98

On 12 April 1994 the retreat of the French evacuation force started. They had been in Kigali for three days now. The French troops had brought with them their own logistical support. The medical support had been guaranteed by the medical treatment facility that accompanied the combat forces. In the assessment of the operation the logistical and medical concept for French NEO are reviewed in more detail in the following chapter.
13 April 1994

Between 5:20 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., the bulk of the task force was redeployed to Bangui in a total of two echelons using five C-160 each. This redeployment was conducted in two echelons. The ten journalists and the coffins of the slain French gendarmes and the slain wife were part of the second echelon. The order for the protection of the flying-out operation by the COS was transmitted from the COIA by teletype at 1:00 p.m. It was not until that order arrived that the 2nd echelon was authorized to depart that day. Lieutenant Colonel Maurin was now in charge of the Airport. All in all, thirty-five soldiers (thirty-three Special Forces and two AMT) were the last French soldiers remaining in Kigali. The departure of the two echelons occurred within a minimum time span. Colonel Poncet left Kigali at about 5:00 p.m. taking the last plane out on that day.

During the evening, it was time for the Belgian paratroopers to withdraw to the airport.

April 13, 1994 was the day of the redeployment. Again Special Forces played a decisive role, this time in covering the redeployment. The assessment of Operation Amaryllis examines the different roles the COS and the CRAP played during the NEO in the next chapter.

14 April 1994

The morning marked the beginning of the withdrawal of Belgian evacuation forces. In the afternoon, the runway came under mortar fire, but this did not prevent the final French elements of the COS from flying out to Bangui at 3:30 p.m. with their own C-130.
At approximately 10:00 a.m. on the following day, the heightened state of alert was called off. Operation Amaryllis was complete. The total number of civilians flown out by French armed forces was 1,250.101

When the evacuation ended on 14 April 1994 the French evacuation forces could be proud of the conduct of their operation. Having been confronted with the brutal pictures of the massacres in and around Kigali, they kept their focus on the rescue of their own citizens. Nevertheless, the question “How the French soldiers handled the psychological stress of the brutality they witnessed?” deserves further review in the assessment of the operation.

Analysis and Evaluation

The purpose of the following discussion is to analyze the individual aspects of Operation Amaryllis to establish a more profound understanding of the conduct and sequence of this type of evacuation operations.

Alerting

Preparation of Alert Measures and Contingency Planning

Immediately after the Rwandan president’s plane was shot down on 6 April 1994 the French forces alerted units in Africa and in France. The alert measures could be triggered so quickly because contingency planning had been conducted months before the incident in order to be prepared to evacuate French citizens out of Rwanda. The following subchapter examines the process of the contingency planning and reviews the alert measures undertaken by the French chain of command.
Based on the assessment of the politico-security situation, the French EMA identified the most probable options for an operation (see figure 14, 1). The EMA tasked the Joint Operational Planning Staff (Etat-major interarmées de planification opérationnelle - EMIA) and the COS with the planning for these options (see figure 14, 2 and 3). Subsequently, contingency plans were implemented down to regimental level (see figure 14, 4). In the case of Operation Amaryllis, the first indications that a crisis was looming resulted in preventive considerations at an early stage.

The pertinent source documents and regulations for the conduct of this type of planning for out-of-area operations taking place in a crisis environment were available. They were:

1. Instruction sur la planification et la conduite des action en cas de crise exterieure (Instructions for the planning and the conduct of military operations in case of an external crisis);

2. Instruction provisoire sur l’organisation du commandement pour la preparation de la conduite des operations (Temporary instructions for the C2 organization to prepare an evacuation operation);

These documents were living documents and were refined whenever necessary. As a rule, these were conceived as joint regulations. Owing to the standardization of this planning and command and control process, the French armed forces had established a joint understanding of the preparation and conduct of such crisis missions.

The German Armed Forces could learn from the French NEO procedures the necessity of having contingency plans and of developing formal NEO doctrine.
Concentration of Evacuation Forces--
Personal and Material Readiness Posture

The majority of the French evacuation forces were already stationed in Central Africa and Gabon when the deployment to Rwanda started. The following subchapter examines the different kind of pre-positioned forces in Africa and reviews the reserve forces in France.

As a rule, the personnel employed in an evacuation operation were recruited among temporary career soldiers or regulars. This was because only these soldiers--owing to the duration of their training--have gathered the experience required for such a mission. Unlike conscripts, these soldiers were available immediately, as there were no political restrictions on their employment.

France could draw on two different types of prepositioned forces capable of immediate reaction from their African garrisons (see figure 15)--the “forces prépositionnées” (prepositioned forces) and “forces temporaires” (temporary forces). Generally, there is no major difference between the two kinds of forces.

A total of 91 percent of the forces involved in Operation Amaryllis were introduced from locations in Africa: 60 percent belonged to the temporary forces and 40 percent to the prepositioned forces. For this reason, France could conduct the NEO without the need for a strategic deployment of forces from Europe.

Besides the employment of forces stationed in Africa, the deployment of forces directly from France could also been foreseen. A base formation (détachement GUEPARD) with varying readiness levels was always kept on standby in France for reinforcing the prepositioned forces or conducting the operation directly from France.
The liberation of hostages in Kolwezi, Zaire, in 1978 by French forces was an example of such an intervention. During Operation Amaryllis, only a small fraction of the evacuation forces were introduced from France. However, on 10 April, another airborne infantry company deployed from France to Bangui and N'djamena, establishing reserve assets for the operation's implementation phase.

Consequently, the French forces had a rapidly deployable force pool available in both Africa and France that was the basis for swiftly and flexibly establishing an evacuation task force. For the prepositioned forces, this swiftness resulted from short deployment distances; for the détachement GUEPARD, from its high readiness posture.

From Operation Amaryllis, the German Armed Forces could learn two points out of this subchapter: keep an extra set of material and equipment available, and maintain a force capable of deploying overseas on short notice. Nevertheless, one significant difference in the situation of the German Armed Forces is that, unlike France, Germany does not have any prepositioned forces in other countries.

Preparation and Training Programs

The French evacuation forces which conducted Operation Amaryllis seemed to be well prepared and trained for NEOs. The reasons for this convincing performance are examined in the following subchapter.

Generally, the conduct of evacuation operations has been intensively studied both for training and teaching purposes.

The evacuation of French citizens was a clearly defined task of the armed forces, which was stipulated in baseline documents including the 1994 White Book.
A broad base of experience could be drawn on— in 1990 and 1991 alone, seven different evacuation operations of French citizens were conducted throughout Africa. At the Collège Interarmées de Défense—the French Command and Staff College—principles for planning and conducting evacuation operations were elaborated by means of a MAPEX/CPX (Ex Eclair/Lightning). Every French officer of the general staff had dealt with this subject at least once. Furthermore, the subject was extensively treated during training for officers and field-grade officers. The French Force d'Action Rapide—a rapid reaction force chiefly tasked with the conduct of out-of-area operations—had published a manual for the evacuation of French citizens ("Evacuation de ressortissants, RESAVAC/EM-FAR-1990/1991"), which was used as a basic document for training. In 11 (FR) Airborne Division, evacuation operation training was carried out as a responsibility of the regiment commanders. Within the two to three years assignment, an inspection (évaluation opérationnelle) took place for each and every company commander leading a company during an FTX in an evacuation operation environment. Moreover, units deploying to Africa as pre-positioned forces or temporary forces underwent specific pretraining geared to the region of their future area of operations. This training cycle also included evacuation training. The training varied as to its points of main effort depending on the planned stationing location and the regional situation. When the forces were prepositioned in Africa, they underwent further NEO training in order to familiarize themselves with the specific challenges in their area of operation. Consequently, French forces stationed or employed in Africa were capable of carrying out a NEO without any additional training. It was an established fact that...
conducted evacuation operations had been tested during exercises at all command levels. Pertinent training guidelines were available, and every leader was familiar with the issue.

Nevertheless, the preparation for Amaryllis could have been better. Although French soldiers had been in Rwanda from 1990 to 1993, only a small amount of maps were available. Furthermore, there were no current lists with the names of the French citizens living in Rwanda available, information that might have been enormously helpful to evacuate the isolated individuals. 109

The way the French forces conducted their NEO training program led to several lessons learned for the development of a German NEO capability. First, NEOs have to be exercised regularly on both tactical and operational levels. Second, they must also be part of the core curriculum of military schools, so that NEO training is an integral part of the professional development of every officer and NCO who might participate in a NEO. Third, there must be a database available that contains information for a NEO, such as maps and names and current locations of personnel with special language training. Finally, units that are designated for NEOs have to conduct FTXs to be prepared for this type of mission. Ideally, such units should conduct their training in countries with the same climate and topography as the probable areas of operations. The problem is that Germany does not possess training facilities in the Africa. Hence, the German Armed Forces should plan for the use of training facilities of its partner nations in this area of the world.
Command and Control Organization and
Procedures in an Evacuation Case

Hierarchy

When France became aware that French citizens had to be evacuated out of the
Rwandan quagmire, planning commenced from the political-strategic to the tactical level.
The following subchapter examines the hierarchy and the procedures that allowed the
quick reaction to the crisis.

As an evacuation operation is mostly caused by a rapidly escalating crisis
situation, the command and control organization must be capable of reacting swiftly from
top to bottom. As soon as there were signs of a potential crisis in a particular area, an
inter-departmental crisis cell (cellule de crise interministerielle) was formed. The cell
comprised representatives from the ministry of defense and the foreign office.
Depending on the situation, these officials were joined by representatives from the
ministries of cooperation, transportation or the interior. The cell coordinated the assets to
be employed, the collected information, and the allocation of tasks.

In this process, the authority to decide whether or not an evacuation operation was
carried out in a crisis area rests with the foreign office. The local French ambassador
submitted an evaluation of the situation and reported the necessity of an evacuation
operation as required.

From a military point of view, the following four essential agents were involved
in the preparation and conduct of an evacuation operation at the strategic and operational
levels (see figure 16): the minister of defense, the CEMA and his staff EMA, and the
COIA, the joint planning staff EMIA, and the joint commander in theater (COIATh,
Commandant interarmées de théâtre) and his staff (PCIAT, poste de commandement interarmées de théâtre).

At the tactical level, the tactical commander of the ground forces (COMTACTER, commandant tactique terre) was in charge of planning and command and control.

The decision as to the type and dimension of the employment was made by the minister of defense based on a proposal developed by the French General Staff. In most cases, the EMIA had prepared planning studies for possible options in potential crisis areas. These studies were elaborated in close coordination with the COS. The CEMA opted for one of these relatively generic options and tasked the EMIA with drawing up the basic operation plan that would depend largely upon available time.

The actual implementation under Order No. 1 would take place at the COIA, after review and adaptation of the available assets. The service commands of the Army, Air Force and Navy (EMAT, EMAA, EMM) were essentially troop contributors as directed by the COIA. Usually, they were not integrated in the actual planning and conduct of the operation. The COIA normally issued its order to the COIATH, who was the joint leader. The COIATH would constantly maintain close connections with the ambassador (by telephone via RITA or SATCOM), the COIA (via SATCOM: INMARSAT, SYRACUSE), the tactical commanders (via VHF, HF, INMARSAT), the evacuation assets (ground, air, sea), and the local armed forces (depending on the situation).

The tactical commander of the ground forces (COMTACTER) reported to the COIATH. In most cases the COMTACTER was located at the evacuation point (point d'évacuation). From here, he coordinated the concentration of French citizens as well as
their evacuation from the theater. Consequently, his headquarter was in a different location than that of the COIATH.

In some cases the organization did not require the involvement of the COIATH. This was either because the operation had to be carried out on very short notice, or the small number of evacuation forces did not require an intermediate command and control level.

During Operation Amaryllis, it was difficult to determine the need for the COIATH. At first guess, this role would have been assigned to the COMEFAO, because he had started initial preparations in Africa on the evening of 6 April 1994. This assumption was challenged by the fact the term COIATH was not used in the chain of command during the remaining phases of the operation. When on 9 April 1994, the overall responsibility of Operation Amaryllis was conferred on Colonel Poncet, this seemed to indicate that the COIATH level was apparently dropped.

In spite of the omission of one level in this case, it was obvious that a clearly defined command and control hierarchy was established for the conduct of an evacuation operation. Each and every actor knew his or her task. The service commands were involved in the operational planning only insofar that they had to provide the ordered forces. Responsibility for the entire military control of the operation rested with the CEMA, where command and control was exercised directly from Paris. This, however, did not rule out that the local tactical commander, COMTACTER, was granted maximum freedom of action.
From the German viewpoint, the necessity of establishing a clear chain of command from the beginning of a NEO is an important lesson that could be learned from the assessment of the French command structure during Operation Amaryllis.

Interdepartmental Cooperation

On 7 April 1994, the day after the assassination, at the political level an interministerial crisis management cell, consisting of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Cooperation, and the Minister of Defense, was immediately established for the purpose of coordinating further courses of action.

In addition to the cooperation at the level of the interdepartmental crisis cell, coordination took place between the embassy and the evacuation forces in the area of operation and in theater. Gathered information was jointly evaluated. Further courses of action and means to be employed were coordinated.

The primary responsibility for NEO is with the foreign office representatives. According to French thinking, evacuation operations involving French citizens are operations that must be initiated and controlled by the foreign office. The armed forces provide merely a contribution of forces and their tasks are limited to the control of key terrain (assembly area, the area where the actual evacuation takes place, embassy), the protection, security and support of the citizens during the evacuation phase and, as required, the transport of the citizens by military assets.

The lesson German Armed Forces could learn from the French interdepartmental cooperation during Operation Amaryllis was the necessity of clearly defining the interfaces between the military and the other interagency participants.
The operational factors of area, time, forces and information interact in the following manner. The available information from Rwanda was inconsistent and unprecise. The resulting unclear image of the situation made time the critical factor, hence becoming the dominating feature in further considerations. With a minimum of time, a force had to be flown to Rwanda to guarantee as quickly as possible the safety of the French citizens. For the time being, the temporary forces and prepositioned forces available in the region were drawn upon to reduce to a minimum the time required to introduce the first force elements.

During this process, all units that could be made available in the allotted time were employed. Consequently, infantry operations had to be performed by forces from other arms or with other equipment (for example artillery personnel of 35th parachute artillery regiment as well as mortar, long-range reconnaissance and antitank platoons of the CEA.

Using an artillery unit for an infantry task could create the impression that the risk of an operation of a not well-suited task force was taken in order to gain time. Nevertheless, this type of approach was what the French basically understand as the modular conduct of evacuation operations. There was no such thing as a standardized evacuation task force. Rather, there was a force structure comprising assets from the
different arms and services. Modular components—ranging from the individual specialist to a company-size force—could be extracted from the structure and regrouped to form a task force depending upon the situation and the mission. These procedures were clearly defined and regularly exercised.

In light of this, the composition of the Amaryllis task force using personnel and assets from twenty-four different units and ten different branches was not exceptional. A fair share of the success of the evacuation operation must surely be attributed to the sound proficiency in infantry skills displayed by employed branches above and beyond ordinary basic training skills.

The lesson the German Armed Forces could learn from the French task organization during Operation Amaryllis was the successful use of a modular approach in bringing together personnel and assets from many different units. This approach offered a useful model for how the German Armed Forces could integrate elements from different units and branches into a cohesive NEO task force. Nevertheless, NEO planners should always determine if there were any mission-capable forces already available in the region that might be able to conduct the NEO. The use of the available artillery unit in an infantry role is one example from Operation Amaryllis that shows that the French planners followed this principle.

Command and Control Means

One of the crucial factors to conduct a successful NEO is the establishment of sufficient command and control means.
Figure 18 provides an overview of the established lines of communications. The official documents to which the author of this thesis had access did not permit the conclusion that there was any friction in operating individual communication links. Furthermore, no information was available as to how communications were maintained between Belgian and French forces during operations.

Besides the ordinary VHF equipment, units of 11th parachute division were equipped with civilian Motorola radios. These had roughly the same weight and the same technical capability as comparable military equipment. However, they were more suited for an employment in built-up terrain due to their frequency range. Added to this was the fact that both the French Embassy in Kigali and some of the French citizens owned this type of equipment. However, the disadvantage of these radios was that messages could not be encrypted and were consequently subject to eavesdropping.

The radio equipment of evacuation forces must enable them to establish and maintain secure and encrypted communications to their military command. The used INMARSAT equipment seemed to be a proven asset in this field. Besides this, compatibility of radio equipment at the tactical level among the services, as well as between the civilian and military personnel, was an absolute must. Wherever possible, interoperability should be sought among the evacuation forces from different nations. Common standards need to be established.

As figure 18 shows, the communication links between all participants in Operation Amaryllis were redundant, thereby guaranteeing continuous and uninterrupted
communications. This principle should be applied in the development of a German NEO communications architecture.

Reconnaissance and Collection of Intelligence

When the French forces started their planning process on the night of 6 April 1994 the situation in Rwanda was relatively unclear. The following subchapter reviews the available information and discusses the necessity of deploying reconnaissance forces prior to the main forces.

Understandably, the French sources were reserved when it came to statements about the employment of members of the intelligence service and the efficiency of satellite reconnaissance. Concrete information was only available via the ambassador and members of the technical military assistance organization. It can only be conjectured whether or not French secret service agents were actually employed locally.

Principally, French considerations pertaining to the conduct of evacuation operations envision the employment of long-range reconnaissance forces for the collection of necessary intelligence, even if such an employment anticipates the political decision taken by the French President. In the case of Operation Amaryllis, those responsible did not opt for reconnaissance only hours ahead of the actual operation, presumably owing to the rapid availability of the task force itself. Moreover, members of the AMT were present in all potential hotspot in the area. The Kigali area itself was well known to the evacuation forces, as the French forces had carried out three operations in Rwanda since 1990.
Only the swift cooperation at the interdepartmental level (foreign office, ministry of transport, and ministry of defense) allowed the French forces to obtain more information about the situation in Kigali rapidly. In the military domain, input came from the Military Intelligence Office (DRM, Direction du renseignement militaire), which provided a real and up-to-date image of the crisis region facilitating quick and purpose-oriented planning and preparation of the operation by the EMIA. No information was available as to how intelligence collection was performed by the COS special operation forces and/or French airborne infantry.

It is obvious that evacuation operations often require acting in an uncertain environment. A quick evaluation of available information obtained from military or civilian sources is absolutely necessary. One’s forces already stationed locally, such as military advisers, must be integrated actively into the preparation of operations in theater. The situation may arise in which—well ahead of a political decision—an employment of special operations forces is required for intelligence collection to support a decision as to whether or not an evacuation operation should be conducted.

Two lessons could be learned for the development of a German NEO capability. First, it is necessary to establish coordination between the Foreign Office, particularly in regards to its available intelligence assets, and the Armed Forces. Secondly, an assessment of the French reconnaissance procedures in 1994 shows that German NEO forces must have a long-range reconnaissance capability in order to obtain essential information prior to executing a NEO.
Role of Special Forces

Two different kinds of Special Forces were used during Operation Amaryllis, five soldiers of the CRAP and thirty-three soldiers of the COS. The CRAP arrived with the first echelon in the morning of 9 April 1994, the COS; coming from France, in the late evening of the same day. Every French paratrooper regiment had a CRAP platoon; they were the organic commando and long range reconnaissance assets.

The COS belonged to a special regiment under the direct command of the EMIA. The COS would be involved in the operational planning at all levels. The COS supported the EMIA in developing basic options for action. Special Forces were represented in their own cell in the COIA. Generally, their task during a NEO was the conduct of special operations (opérations discrètes) that included the reconnaissance of the airport of debarkation/seaport of debarkation (APOD/SPOD), the screening of the French Embassy, the screening the arrival of the main body, hostage rescue, the marshaling of isolated French nationals, and the screening of the redeployment of the main body.

During Operation Amaryllis, with the employment of the thirty-three COS members under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Maurin, these general tasks were specified as the locating of missing persons, the reconnaissance of the local situation, the extraction of isolated Europeans, the coordination of CAS if necessary, and the advice for the COMOPS.112

There were no hostage-taking situations during Operation Amaryllis. The sources did not reveal if, in the case of negative agitation of the population by the propaganda radio station "Radio Milles Collines" against the evacuation forces, an employment of Special Forces had been envisaged. Nevertheless, this underlines the importance of
integrating Special Forces into the planning process early on. Such expertise is needed where decisions are made. Special Forces influence operational planning through the coordination process between the COS and the EMIA, and they draw on their own cell in the COIA to do so during conduct of operations.

The need for Special Forces in NEOs is one of the major lessons that could be drawn from Operation Amaryllis for the development of a German NEO capability. Having no comparable forces to the French COS was one of the major factors that led to the cancellation of a German NEO in Rwanda in 1994.

Logistics and Medical Support

Logistical and medical support had never been a problem during the whole seven days of Operation Amaryllis. The reasons for this efficiency are discussed in the following subchapter.

First of all, the logistical commander of Operation Amaryllis was responsible for both the logistical support and for civil affairs. This dual-hatted position provided for an optimum utilization of existing civilian and military capabilities. In addition, the commander of the task force carried a large sum of money with him, which was used to purchase items necessary for the operation (for example rental of civilian vehicles).

The task force carried three days of supply of rations and water plus prepared rations for the evacuees. These standardized supplies had been prepared in Bangui, where they were kept on standby. (Subsequently, this package was expanded to include hygiene articles as a result of the lessons learned during Operation Amaryllis.) Follow-
on supply was provided with the Transall aircraft returning empty to Bangui. Aircraft fuel was taken from the fuel tanks at the Kigali airport.

The issue of necessary transportation found a practicable solution. Only four small P4 vehicles had been flown into Kigali. Several vehicles were rented from the Rwandan armed forces. Besides this, the task force used the vehicles of the French embassy and the civilian vehicles left at the airport by the first evacuees.

Repair assets deployed to Bangui consisted of a French Air Force forward repair team, which assured operational readiness of the nine employed Transall aircraft during the entire operation.

When the massacres in Kigali started on 6 April 1994 the hospitals in Kigali were soon overwhelmed with injured victims. Hence, the French evacuation forces could not rely on these medical treatment facilities. Therefore, by the evening of 6 April, 7th ACP had been deployed from Chad to Bangui and arrived in Kigali on 9 April as part of the second echelon. Moreover, each maneuver platoon had one medic with special training. Another medic was available in the command and support team at company level. In the assignment of airlift capacity, the evacuation of injured people had highest priority. The hospital at Bangui had been alerted to receive injured or sick people.

It should always be considered whether or not one's vehicles, if not armored vehicles, are actually required in theater. Depending on the situation, even locally available equipment may be used. Possibly, unorthodox methods must be applied in making available transportation capacity. After the UNAMIR had refused to provide any transport vehicles to the French evacuation forces, the contingent used and modified with
simple means the private cars of the evacuated civilians. Other sources confirmed that the French soldiers just borrowed, or in other words stole, some UNAMIR vehicles.\textsuperscript{113} The official report of the French Assemble Nationale describes this nicely by saying, “the French evacuation forces could motorize themselves by fortunately finding some abandoned UNAMIR cars.”\textsuperscript{114} Nevertheless, if an operation is conducted without organic transport vehicles, there will always be the risk of depending on what can be purchased locally. In such an environment, reacting to unforeseen situations will always be a challenging task.

The preparation of ready-to-use equipment packages must be tailored to the evacuees’ needs. Employment of medical support will chiefly be limited to rendering patients fit for air travel.

Two lessons can be learned for the development of a German NEO capability. First, German NEO forces should prepare these aforementioned tailored equipment packages. Secondly, the evacuation forces must be aware that medical support for evacuation forces and evacuees is usually not be provided in the crisis country. Germany’s own organic medical assets have to be deployed with its NEO forces.

Role of the Air Force

Figure 19 provides an overview of the air movements of the nine assigned military aircraft during Operation Amaryllis.\textsuperscript{115} A total of more than 3,100 passenger and 119 tons of material were airlifted. Air movements were coordinated by the 3rd dimension cell (cellule 3D) established at the task force command post. The cell comprised twenty-one soldiers.
During Operation Amaryllis, French NEO forces relied exclusively on military air transportation assets that were immediately available on 6 April 1994 (two C-160 in Bangui and two C-130 in Libreville). Nevertheless, the French forces had also contracted with civilian airlines to make available additional transport capacity of 120 tons on a six-hour-notice. This back-up transportation capacity was not used during the operation.

The German Armed Forces could learn the following lesson from the way France conducted air operations during Operation Amaryllis. Although a NEO in Africa could be successfully conducted using only C-130s and C-160s, this approach may not work unless other types of transportation assets are also available. During Operation Amaryllis, the cargo load capacity of the French air transportation assets was so limited that they had to rely on land transportation assets in Rwanda. The French doctrinal solution of using back-up civilian aircraft, if necessary, could offer one possible solution to overcoming a shortage of strategic military transport capacity.

Multinational Planning and Conduct of Operations

While the focus of this thesis is the development of a German pure national NEO capability, it is also necessary to take a look at the multinational conduct of Operation Amaryllis in order to understand the operation.

In contrast to the results of the previous research at the German Fuehrungsakademie, the interview with the Belgium general staff officer, Frederic Derolez, brought some doubts as to whether the cooperation between the French and Belgian governments, both general staffs and the forces employed in Rwanda, was really
as flawless as it was presented by members of the French General Staff during the
author's previous interviews with them in 1996.

On 8 April, a coordination meeting took place between the head of the COIA and
the Belgian General Staff. It was here that the decision was made to execute a combined
evacuation operation. Liaison teams were exchanged on the General Staff level and
planning was combined. Tasks, assets and areas were assigned, and areas of
responsibility were clearly defined. The Dutch armed forces provided one C-130 aircraft
in support of the Belgians. According to the French presentation, upon the arrival of
the Belgian forces in Kigali late in the afternoon of 10 April, a tactical, joint and
combined staff was established at the Kigali airport. Major Derolez, the S2 officer of the
Belgian battalion, could not confirm the existence of such a combined staff. "I have
never seen a combined command structure, and I think nothing like this did exist."

Because of this discrepancy between the presentation of the fact, this thesis
cannot prove how efficient the cooperation between the French and the Belgium forces
really was. The French General staff officer, when interviewed in 1996, defined the
cooperation within the "combined-tactical" staff as very positive. The commanders of
the task forces assessed the situation together and coordinated their conduct of the
operation. Finally, both commanders were much more in contact with each other than
with the Belgian and French paratroopers employed in different city districts of the Kigali
conurbation. This might be one of the reasons why Major Derolez could not confirm the
existence of this combined staff.
At this point in the thesis, one must remember the main question is, what lessons could be learned from Operation Amaryllis for a German NEO capability. For a pure German NEO capability, in which Germany conducts NEOs by itself, the review of the multinational planning and execution process during Operation Amaryllis was not useful. Nevertheless, following the “think out of the box” principle, the question should be expanded to ask, what would come after a pure German NEO capability? Could it be made more efficient? Hence, some observations of multinational aspects of the combined Franco-Belgian conduct of Operation Amaryllis should be made. Without a doubt, combined NEOs are more efficient because scarceresources or infrastructure, like airfields, could be shared.

Handling of the Evacuees

French evacuees, who were flown out between 9 April and 12 April 1994, praised the very professional support that had been provided by the French evacuation forces. As far as the available sources show, no friction occurred, neither at the marshaling points in downtown Kigali, nor at the airport. The procedures of handling evacuees were standardized and allowed frictionless conduct of the NEO. The following subchapter reviews these procedures.

In most cases, it was generally not the military commander who decided which persons were to be evacuated. This decision was made by the local consulate, who in turn received directives from the foreign office, or from the French Embassy. However, there were exceptions in which the military commander acted on his own or in the absence of specific directives. Only in these cases, was the military commander obliged
to evacuate each and every person seeking to be evacuated, provided adequate means were available.

The following priorities were generally established for an evacuation: 120

1. Nationals, nationals and their families permanently residing in the theater, nationals and their families occasionally residing in the theater, official members of major government institutions, and persons with dual nationality.

2. Nationals' foreign relatives, foreign employees, European nationals, other foreign nationals in accordance with the directive of the Ambassador or the foreign office. Within each category, the following priorities were established: pregnant women; women with children under the age of 18 years; unaccompanied children under the age of 18 years; elderly or handicapped persons, and unaccompanied women.

The evacuees rescued under Operation Amaryllis had mostly been confronted with the horrible experience of massacres. Some of them had been in their apartments cut off from the outside world for several days. Power and water supply had been interrupted. In this environment it mattered most to offer these people the feeling of safety and to supply them with basic necessities. When the evacuees reached the CENTREVAC (evacuation center) at the airport this support could be provided.

The process of checking-in at the CENTREVAC had been specified and trained precisely. 121 Soldiers employed here had all undergone a special training. These measures reduced friction.

For the development of a German NEO capability, the following two lessons could be learned. First, every soldier who is part of a NEO contingent must be
thoroughly trained on procedures for handling traumatized evacuees. Secondly, the CENTREVAC should be used as a model for the development of a German organization whose primary mission is evacuee support.

Handling of the Population and Dealing with the Civil War Factions

The necessity to carefully assess belligerents and the civilian population is absolutely important to guarantee a frictionless conduct of a NEO. Understanding the conflict by studying its historical background is the first step of this evaluation.

In April 1994 the French evacuation forces were well received at first by the Hutu population, because the Hutu hoped that France would—as in 1990 and 1992—again repel the FPR attack. The operation would have been threatened if the Hutu had realized that the French would withdraw their forces after a successful evacuation. On the other side, the FPR threatened to conduct violent acts against the French soldiers if they remained in Kigali longer than required for the purpose of the evacuation. On 9 April, Mr. Denis Polisi, the FPR vice chairman declared, “The Patriotic Front (FPR) demands that France does not interfere with the (Rwandan) problem and limits itself to evacuating her nationals.” The French soldiers reacted very cleverly to this demand. Their appearance was self-confident but defensive. Helmets and protection vests were not used. Armored vehicles were deliberately not employed. Surely, by this attitude, a certain risk was taken, but the message was clear, “We are not afraid of you, and you do not have to be afraid of us.” This trust relationship received a boost from the fact that the French maintained their absolute neutrality. However, to complete the picture, it must not be forgotten that, for this reason, both Tutsi seeking protection and moderate Hutu
had to be sent away. In isolated cases, the soldiers had to threaten the use of force to pass through a crowd of those seeking help. Maintaining absolute neutrality also required a clear chain of command that had to take into consideration all contingencies.

The moderate behavior of the French evacuation forces was successful. It was not a deliberate martial attitude that created the trust, since the paratroopers' sole intention was to evacuate their compatriots, but the adherence to strict neutrality paired with a media campaign which portrayed no hostility to the civil war factions and allowed them to verify the French approach. During Operation Amaryllis, the COIA, through publication of ROE on 8 April 1994, established a policy of strict neutrality in the conduct of the operation. This policy reinforced preexisting NEO ROE principles, such as the limitation on the use of deadly force to self defense of evacuation forces, that had been practiced and internalized by all soldiers participating in Operation Amaryllis in prior training exercises.

Three lessons could be learned from the way the French evacuation forces handled the population and dealt with the civil war factions in Rwanda. First, the different factions in a civil war have to be carefully assessed in order to understand the conflict and to anticipate their behavior. Second, over-emphasis on force protection might be counterproductive for the conduct of a NEO. Finally, standardized and exercised ROE enhance a unit's ability to conduct a NEO.

Dealing With The Media

During Operation Amaryllis, cooperation with the media was exemplary. Again and again, the public information campaign underlined that the French mission's sole
object was to protect French citizens. The public information campaign was entirely focused on the potential enemy, the FPR.

In an interview on Radio-France-International, the French Minister of cooperation, Michel Roussin, explained on 10 April, “The French soldiers will not intervene.” On 13 April, the news of the reduction of the task force's strength by one company was published in international newspapers, signaling the end of the evacuation operation. The FPR did not attack any French forces during the entire Operation Amaryllis.

In Rwanda, the Operation Amaryllis press officer was sent in from the French forces' public information agency, which was open to all media representatives. As this officer was a public information expert and personally known to some of the journalists, the coordination of media activities in place was absolutely flawless. In this context, the press cell in the command post of the task force was not only responsible for the distribution of information but also for the assistance and support of the ten accredited journalists, as well as for making communications and transportation assets available for them.

In his operation order, the task force commander, Colonel Poncet, specified the concept of public information. Journalists would have no access to the operations center or to other command post sections. They were briefed twice a day, either by the commander himself, his deputy, or by the press officer. The journalists were also considered during the process of redeployment. Even though they had come to the theater voluntarily, they were considered to be evacuees during the final phase of the
operation, and they had to be incorporated in the allocation of space on the last outbound aircraft.

It has become clear that a professional public information campaign is an indispensable prerequisite for mastering the fourth operational factor of information during an evacuation operation. For this purpose, the media must be offered the best possible support. Fairness in dealing with one another should bring about fair coverage, which is not in conflict with military objectives.

What could the German Armed Forces learn from the French way to deal with the media? First, a media concept was helpful for cooperating with journalists in a fair and appropriate manner. Secondly, the media were able to influence the belligerents, especially the FPR, by emphasizing the neutrality of the French forces in their coverage.

Psychological Stress

Although the soldiers of the French forces personally witnessed the massacres in Rwanda, the official sources do not suggest any extraordinary manifestation of stress symptoms. It seems as if the soldiers had not suffered any mental stress. Possibly, this was due to the fact that the paratroopers had already demonstrated stability under stress during their NEO training. Another explanation could have been the fact that the mission itself had been a success without any friendly losses and that the French citizens were all evacuated safely.

The lesson learned for the German Armed Forces was that NEOs require experienced, trained professional soldiers. It is doubtful that conscripts are suitable for this type of mission.
It is highland country, extending from the Central African Trench on Lake Kivu, located at an elevation of almost 1500 m through the eastern edge of that trench (2,000 to 3,000 meters), all the way to the East African Highlands (1,500 to 1,700 meters). The major portion of that territory consists of a hill plateau (this is where the capital of Kigali lies) which continues to the north into the chain of the Virunga volcanoes. Due to this elevation, the sporadic humid and tropical climate is pleasantly different from the humid and hot equatorial zone of Africa. The so-called great rainy season lasts from March to May.

A second international airport is at Cyangugu on Lake Kivu. The design of the latter only permits the landing of medium-range aircraft. Four other airstrips at Butare, Gabiro, Ruhengeri and Nemba would have permitted the landing of combat zone aircraft (C-160, C-130) with the evacuation forces; however, the Ruhengeri and Gabiro airfields in the north had to be ruled out from any planning because they were located right in the combat zone. Nor was it practical to evacuate by way of Butare, Nemba, and Cyangugu. In all three cases, evacuees would have had to be transferred by land to the airstrips. All three of them, however, are located close to the border with the former Zaire, respectively Burundi, so that if this option had been chosen, it would undoubtedly have been more practical to cover the final kilometers into the safe neighboring countries by ground transportation. For the planning of an evacuation operation by air, the only option left was to evacuate with large capacity aircraft using the Kayibanda airport near Kigali.

The airport is named after the first Rwandan Prime-minister Kayibanda.

11 Hartmut Dissernbacher, Buergerkrieg und Voelkermord in Ruanda/Ethnischer Klassenkonflikt und Bevoelkerungswachstum (Bonn: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 1994), 19.

12 Baechler, 14.

13 Metz, 4.

14 Peter Molt, Die ruandische Tragoedie, (Bonn: Politische Meinung, 1994), 56.


16 Frankfurter Rundschau (Frankfurt), 5 June 1994.

17 Molt, 56.

18 Baechler, 13.

19 Makinda, 582.

20 Ibid., 582.

21 Molt, 57.

22 Molt, 14.


24 Makinda, 583.

25 Makinda, 583.

26 Neue Zuericher Zeitung (Zuerich), 5 May 1994.

27 Makinda, 584.

28 Molt, 59.

29 Makinda, 583.
30 Dissenbacher, 15.

31 Metz, 7.

32 Representatives of the Amt fuer Nachrichtenwesen der Bundeswehr (German Military Intelligence Office), interview by author, 16 April 1996, Bad Neuenahr.


34 Makinda, 582.


36 Representatives of the Amt fuer Nachrichtenwesen, interview.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Charles Kayonga, interview.


42 Charles Kayonga, interview.

43 Representatives of the Amt fuer Nachrichtenwesen, interview.

44 Representatives of the French General Staff, interview.

45 LG Berhin, Bericht der streitkraefteinterenen Unetrsuchungskommision ueber den Tod der zehn als Kommandotrupp eingesetzten Fallschirmjaeger am 7.April 1994 (Brussels: Generalinspekteur of the Belgium Army, 1994).

46 La libre Belgique (Belgium), 11 April 1994.

47 Le Figaro (Paris), 07 April 1994.
48 El Watan (France), 10 April 1994.
49 Liberation (France), 8 April 1994.
50 Bulletin Quotidien (France), 11 April 1994.
51 France Soir (France), 8 April 1994.
52 La republique du centre-ouest (France), 9 April 1994.
53 La republique du centre-ouest (France), 11 April 1994.
54 Le journal de Dimanche (France), 10 April 1994.
55 Le Quatidien (France), 11 April 1994.
56 El Pais (Spain), 11 April 1994.
59 Representatives of the Amt fuer Nachrichtenwesen, interview.
60 Berhin, 9.
61 Bulletin Quotidien (France), 11 April 1994.
62 Representatives French General Staff, interview.
63 Molt, 3.
65 Ibid., 265.
66 Jansohn, 82.
67 Ibid., 264.
68 Ibid., 259.
69 Kayonga, interview.
70 Jansohn, 82-83.
71 Assemblée Nationale, 264.
72 Ibid., 260.
73 *Bulletin Quotidien* (France), 11 April 1994.
74 Ibid., 8 April 1994.
75 Assemblée Nationale, 267.
76 Ibid., 262.
77 Jansohn, 83-84.
78 Assemblée Nationale, 265.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., 263.
83 Jansohn, 84-85.
84 Assemblée Nationale, 266.
85 Kayonga, interview.
86 Assemblée Nationale, 267.
87 Interview Frederik Derolez.
88 Assemblée Nationale, 268.
89 AFP (Paris), 11 April 1994.

90 Assemblée Nationale, 266.

91 Ibid., 269.

92 Kayonga, interview.

93 Assemblée Nationale, 264.

94 Ibid., 267.

95 Ibid.

96 Ibid.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid., 264.

99 Ibid., 267.

100 Jansohn, 87-88.

101 Ibid., 88.


103 Representatives French General Staff, interview.

104 Representatives French General Staff, interview.


106 The “forces prépositionnées” were permanently stationed in several African countries with whom France had entered defense agreements. These countries were Senegal, Gabon, Ivory Coast, and Djibouti. Prepositioned forces were principally joint formations that varied in their composition. The “forces temporaires” had remained in a country after an employment of French forces there. This was the case in Chad and in the Central African Republic. According to French sources, the affected country had requested the continued deployment of these forces. Basically, their missions were identical to those of the prepositioned forces. Both types of forces maintained an extra
set of material and equipment required for evacuation operations prepositioned in their locations. This guaranteed a high combat readiness status of the evacuation forces.

In this context, a distinction was made between a reinforcement, and an intervention and/or an interposition. A reinforcement took place in those countries where one’s own forces had already been stationed and where these forces were expected and received. Consequently, the forces would not have to secure their area of arrival (zone d'arrivée). The terms intervention and interposition (as a moderator between factions) were used in connection with areas of operations without the presence of French infrastructure and forces. These types of operation were launched from France and the deployment usually took place by air movement. Sealift or ground transport was also an option. In this environment, forces would not be able to rely on prepositioned equipment. Sometimes a forced entry operation was required.

National Military Strategy.

Assemblé Nationale, 268.

Representatives of the French General Staff, interview.

Le journal du Dimanche (France), 10 April 1994.

Assemblé Nationale, Ibid., 273.

M Frederic Derolez. Interview by Uwe Jansohn, 21 October 1999, Leavenworth.

Assemblé Nationale, Ibid., 265.

Representatives French General Staff, interview.

No information was available as to the operational planning of the Jaguar and Mirage F1 aircraft stationed in Bangui. These aircraft would have been available for operations after the arrival of the tanker aircraft type C-135 FR over Rwanda as of April 10.

Ibid., interview.

Interview with Maj Derolez.

The evacuation operation Ippocampo conducted simultaneously by the Italian armed forces took place without any coordination with the Belgian or French evacuation forces. There had been brief consultations at the government-level on a potential approach, but locally, in Kigali, no liaison was established once the Italians deployed on April 10. Italian Special Forces, 112 paratroopers, did not coordinate their operation with
the French and the Belgian contingent. The Italians evacuated 143 Italian nationals. American forces, about 80 Marines, were on standby status in Bujumbura. They had two CH-53 helicopters with them. Cooperation with the European evacuation forces did not happen. The American contingent was totally focused on monitoring the evacuation of US embassy personnel, British and French citizens overland.\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{120}Cours supérieur, 28.

\textsuperscript{121}Ibid, 29.

\textsuperscript{122}AFP (OUAGADOUGOU), 9 April 1994.

\textsuperscript{123}Reuter (Paris), 10 April 1994.

\textsuperscript{124}Le Parisien (Paris), 13 April 1994.
CHAPTER 5

THE INFLUENCE OF OPERATION AMARYLLIS
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A GERMAN NEO CAPABILITY

This chapter answers the question, How much has the development of a German NEO capability been affected by the conduct of the French Operation Amaryllis in 1994?

Generally speaking, Amaryllis influenced the development in three ways:

First, the decision not to evacuate the threatened German citizens in the radio station Deutsche Welle in Kigali when the riots broke out in April 1994 forced the German Armed Forces to face their inability to conduct NEO. The chief of army’s statement, “I do not want to see repeated what happened . . .!” became the basis for action.\(^1\)

Second, the case study on Operation Amaryllis conducted by the author of this thesis in 1996 was intensively evaluated by German Army Forces Command and by the Ministry of Defense and influenced the development of a German NEO capability in so far that the existing planning documents were reviewed and revised.

Third, the author himself, in his function as G3 NEO in the operations branch of German Army Forces Command, was responsible for the further development and the continuation of the principal basic documents concerning NEOs. He could bring in his experience out of his study and analysis of the operation. Given the task to prepare the first exercise (Quick Dolphin) ever conducted by German Forces Army Command in 1999, he chose a NEO scenario that was identical to the 1994 crisis in Rwanda.

Having shown these general links between Operation Amaryllis and the German NEO concept, this chapter examines first the question, What should have been learned
What Lessons Should be Learned from Amaryllis?

The subsequent list summarizes and discusses the twenty-one lessons that should be learned from Operation Amaryllis, as they were developed in the last chapter.

Lesson 1: Special Forces Must Be Included in NEO

In the uncertain environment of an evacuation scenario, Special Forces play an important role during the whole operation. In Operation Amaryllis the COS and the CRAP conducted decisive operations such as the rescue of the children of the French orphanage in Masaka on 10 April 1994 and the covering of the redeployment of the main forces. Usually deployed prior to the main forces and specially trained and equipped, Special Forces can cover the whole spectrum of necessary support for the evacuation force. They have a broad range of capabilities to accomplish multiple tasks, such as the conduct of the necessary reconnaissance, the preparation of the airport of debarkation (APOD), and the link up with the embassy. Special Forces, due to their specialized training, are highly capable of handling hostage situations and marshaling isolated
evacuees. Finally Special Forces are qualified to cover the redeployment when the NEO is completed.

Lesson 2: The Basic Principles For The Conduct Of The Operation Must Be Detailed In Doctrinal Based Documents

Like the alert roster, the procedures for the conduct of a NEO must be described in doctrinal documents and in basic orders throughout all command levels involved in a NEO. This ensures that all key players operate in the same manner. These documents are living documents and must be refined whenever necessary. As shown in the last chapter, France had prepared these documents on all command levels.

Lesson 3: Over-Emphasized Force Protection Policies Might Be Counterproductive For The Conduct Of A NEO

NEOs are always a tightrope walk. Too much force protection of the evacuation forces can be counterproductive to the aim of the NEO. Local inhabitants might get the impression that intervention forces have arrived rather than neutral evacuation forces. The French decision not to use body armor or helmets during Operation Amaryllis fostered the neutral appearance of the evacuation forces.

Lesson 4: Interfaces Must be Clearly Defined

There is a multitude of interfaces that must be clearly defined. One of the most important ones is the inter-departmental or inter-ministerial interface. It is mandatory that the basic military principles for the conduct of NEOs are coordinated with the foreign ministry. Other ministries must be included if necessary. The establishment of an inter-departmental crisis cell in case of an emergency, such as the one used in the French model, might be helpful. The responsibilities of the different departments have to be defined precisely. One of the core questions is; Who is in charge and when?
The next interface that has to be defined is the coordination between the different services. NEOs are always joint operations. The question of which service is in charge of an operation must be resolved early on. Furthermore, agencies like the Amt fuer Nachrichtenwesen der Bundeswehr (Federal Armed Forces Intelligence Office) have to be involved.

On the tactical level, procedures for the cooperation between the evacuation forces and the embassy must be regulated. Generally, the question, Who is responsible for what? must be answered on this level. In principle, the ambassador has the overall responsibility for the operation, due to the fact that he has the necessary expertise in the particular country. Preparatory consular measures, such as marshaling procedures have to be in concert with the military procedures. Priorities such as the order of evacuation have to be established. The French procedures provide helpful hints.

**Lesson 5: Keep Equipment, Materiel, and Necessary Logistical Support for a NEO Permanently Available**

When the French evacuation forces in Bangui and Libreville were alerted on 1 April 1994 at 9:00 p.m., they immediately prepared their equipment and the prepositioned logistical packages for deployment. As shown in the last chapter, the French prepositioned forces have a redundant set of equipment available in their garrisons in Africa.

Although Germany does not have forces deployed outside of Europe, it can still learn from the French approach of maintaining a redundant set of equipment that is not used in daily training. This equipment cache must be available to guarantee the operational readiness of the evacuation forces. Because it is not possible to pre-position
this equipment in theatre, it should be stored nearby at the potential airport of embarkation (APOE) in Germany. The same principle has to be applied for materiel and logistical support. The French evacuation forces followed this approach, with the advantage that their redundant materiel was already pre-positioned material in Africa.

Lesson 6: The Key For The Success Of A NEO Is The Quick Availability Of Sufficient Air-Transport Assets

Like the French Armed Forces, the German Armed Forces have no strategic deployment air-assets. Therefore, they rely heavily on their C-160 airplanes, which restricts the possible cargo load. Hence, the airlifting of helicopters is very difficult. The use of larger civilian cargo planes like the Russian Antonov needs long-term preliminary contracts. The German Armed forces should follow the French approach and enter agreements with civilian airlines that guaranteed the provision of a certain transport capacity on short-notice. A more suitable course of action from a military perspective would be to buy strategic air assets for the German Armed Forces. However, current shortfalls in the German defense spending do not indicate that this course of action will be executed.

Lesson 7: Establish A Clear Command Structure From The Beginning Of An Operation

Like in the French hierarchy during Operation Amaryllis (with a inter-ministerial crisis management cell, COIA, COIATH and COMTACTER) the role of the German Ministry of Defense (MOD), the lead service forces command, the other involved services commands, the operational commander in theatre, and the tactical commander in the evacuation country must be clearly defined to prevent confusion about areas of responsibility during the NEO.
Lesson 8: Maintain Continuous And Redundant Communication Lines Between All Participants Involved In A NEO

With their enormous possible political implications NEOs require permanent command and control effectiveness that, in the extreme case, allows the Defense Minister to communicate directly with the Task Force Commander in country. The established French communication links during Operation Amaryllis provide a model for a necessary redundant communication network (figure 18).

Lesson 9: Evacuation Forces Should Be Put Together With Flexible Modular Sub-Elements Of A Unit Construction System.

Germany cannot rely on any prepositioned forces in theatre like the French forces in Africa in 1994. Furthermore, Germany cannot afford a pure evacuation force, which has the sole task to conduct NEOs. Therefore, an evacuation force must be tailored for a specific mission out of forces and specialists from all services and branches.

The solution is a modular system that allows a unit-construction system to pick necessary forces focused to a particular scenario and existing conditions. The French approach of combining prepositioned forces with alert units in France during Operation Amaryllis followed this method.

Furthermore, NEO planners should always determine if there are other forces available in the vicinity of a mission area. If so, the German Armed Forces should not hesitate to make use of them.

Lesson 10: Neos Require Special Kinds Of Personnel

For evacuation forces, only career service members or shorter-service volunteers should be used. Only they have enough training to be prepared to conduct complex
NEOs. Furthermore, a conscript cannot legally be ordered against his will to serve outside of Germany.

Physical and psychological robustness is mandatory and has to be checked regularly. Vaccination programs must cover potential mission areas. As with any military issue, readiness is the key to success. France, which in 1994 still had conscription, followed the same model.

**Lesson 11: Military Forces Must Be Prepared For Neos And Have Contingency Plans Ready**

High-risk regions must be identified in a continuing process. Basic data such as maps, cultural, social and economic conditions must be collected and understood. This is a precaution in order to shorten the planning cycle of a NEO. Key questions are:

1. What kinds of intelligence sources are available in the risk country?
2. What partner nations (U.S., France, GB, Belgium . . .) may also have an interest?
3. What infrastructure is available?
4. In which neighboring country could a rear base be established?

This basic information should be collected and managed in one central database, which must be accessible for all personnel involved in the planning and execution of the NEO.

**Lesson 12: Alert Procedures Must Be Established And Exercised Regularly**

Detailed alert procedures allow units to shorten the preparation time for the evacuation forces. Hence, involved players in the NEO know exactly what to do. Furthermore, the alarm schedule, by triggering the alert measures, reduces the necessary
issuance of orders. The process is only effective if it is regularly exercised, continuously adapted, and improved upon.

Lesson 13: NEO Procedures Must Be Regularly Exercised

The assessment of the French preparation and training program in the last chapter showed that the evacuation forces that were committed during Operation Amaryllis had participated in preparation training. Such training, particularly FTXs, was conducted prior to their deployment to Africa and tailored to that area of the world. Hence, the French evacuation forces were well-prepared for Operation Amaryllis.

The lesson for the development of a German NEO capability is that NEO procedures and the concentration of the foreseen modular evacuation forces must be practiced in field training exercises (FTX). But this is not enough. All participants in NEOs must practice their tasks regularly. This includes not only the involved operational command level but also the Ministry of Defense. Ideally, other governmental departments should be involved. Training these levels can be accomplished through command post exercises (CPX).

Lesson 14: To Internalize The Principles Of Neos, Neos Must Also Be Part Of The Formal Professional Development At Every Level

As evaluated in the last chapter, every French officer and NCO has been confronted several times during his professional development with the topic of NEOs. For example, every general staff officer participates in a NEO MAPEX during his time at the Collège Interarmées de Défense. The German Armed Forces should follow this model because the planning and the conduct of NEOs is one of the most probable
missions for the German Bundeswehr. Therefore, mission planning should also become a
general part of the instruction in German officer and NCO training.

Lesson 15: Medical Support Of Evacuees And Evacuation Forces
Usually Cannot Be Provided In The Crisis Country

As shown in the last two chapters, the hospitals in Kigali were filled immediately
after the genocide started on 6 April 1994. Therefore, the evacuation forces could not
rely on them. Also, it should not been forgotten that hospitals in the potential mission
area usually do not meet European standards. The French solved the problem by
bringing in the ACP. The lesson learned for the German Armed forces is that organic
medical forces capable of performing up to Level III medical treatment have to be
predetermined for the NEO contingent in order to guarantee adequate medical treatment
for the evacuation forces and the evacuees.

Lesson 16: Standardized And Exercised ROE For NEOs Give
Freedom Of Action To The Participating Soldier

As shown in the last chapter, the COIA provided the ROE with the first operation
order on 8 April 1994 at 11:30 p.m. Due to their prior training, the French forces were
already familiar with the basic ROE principles. Their prior training was one of the keys
of the success of the operation.

Strict adherence to the ROE must also become a German NEO principle. Even if
the ROE have to be adapted for each mission, a general comprehension with the basic
principles during training prepares every soldier in an appropriate manner.
Lesson 17: Carefully Assess The Different Belligerents And Maintain Strict Neutrality

Neutrality of the evacuation forces is the "conditio sine qua non" in scenarios like the civil war in Rwanda. Nevertheless, maintaining neutrality does not release NEO forces from carefully assessing belligerents and developing tailored concepts as to how to deal with each of them. The study of the historical background is the first step to in understanding the character of a crisis.

Lesson 18: A Media Concept for NEO Must Be Prepared

Operation Amaryllis has shown that structured and well-organized dealings with the media can influence the behavior of the belligerents in a positive manner. Success in this case lay in the French media concept. Germany should follow the French model.

Lesson 19: The Procedures For Handling Evacuees Must Be Developed And Internalized By All Participating NEO Soldiers

When the evacuees arrived at the CENTREVAC at the Kigali airport during Operation Amaryllis, they were exhausted and had been confronted with the pictures of death and murder. The handling of often traumatized evacuees requires a certain sensitivity and situational awareness. Standard procedures give the soldiers the necessary ability to act in the right manner.

Lesson 20: Be Able To Think Multinationally

As already mentioned in the last chapter, this lesson goes beyond the intent of developing a pure German NEO capability. Nevertheless, it should be considered in order to figure out the next steps in the development of a NEO capability once the interim goal, a pure German NEO capability, will be achieved. Usually, the necessity to evacuate persons from a crisis-wracked country involves several nations. Furthermore, available
resources and usable infrastructure are limited. For example, several airports in Africa can only handle a limited number of aircraft. Hence, coordination between nations becomes essential for the successful completion of a NEO.

Furthermore, the efficiency of a NEO can be enhanced if countries share their different abilities and strengths, as for example, the use of U.S. strategic air-transport assets to deploy larger equipment like helicopters. Common contingency plans developed prior to a NEO can simplify this coordination process. The combined operation offers a much greater chance of success. A good example of this combined effectiveness was the cooperation between the Belgian and the French evacuation forces during Operation Amaryllis.

Lesson 21: To Prepare Evacuation Forces For The Climatic Challenges Of Unfamiliar Regions, Make Uses Of Training Facilities Of Your Partner Nations

German soldiers have to be prepared for the climatic characteristics of potential mission areas. The use of French training facilities in Africa or South America is one possible approach. The performance of so-called adventure-training according to the British concept, in which the soldiers participate in civilian expeditions throughout the world, is a second approach to prepare soldiers.

The Measures Undertaken By The Bundeswehr 1994-1999

After the inability of the Bundeswehr to evacuate the threatened Germans in Rwanda in 1994, the Generalinspekteur (Chief of Federal Armed Forces Staff) gave to the Army Staff the mission to develop a national evacuation capability. The overall responsibility was assigned to the Fuehrungszentrum (FueZBw), which is the operations
center of the Ministry of Defense and responsible for the command and control of military operations conducted by the Bundeswehr. The FueZBw, in coordination with the Services Staffs and including the different Service Forces Commands, developed a joint concept, which led to the so-called Standardevakuierungsverband (SEV), a standard evacuation task force. The SEV was born from the idea of a standardized unit to conduct NEOs.

Parallel to the development of the concept of the SEV, the events of 1994 facilitated Germany’s decision to create a command for the conduct of special operations. The aforementioned lesson I had been learned and acted upon. Without trained and equipped Special Forces, NEOs cannot be conducted effectively. Up to this point, the Bundeswehr had possessed three so-called Kommandokompanien (commando companies) that had been assigned, one each, to the three airborne brigades and had had a kind of shadowy existence. Previously, there was no direction on how to employ these forces. This changed in 1994 when the Generalinspekteur approved the concept for the creation of Special Forces and directed that a brigade equivalent should be formed and task organized. An airborne brigade would be transferred to the Kommando Spezialkraefte (Special Forces Command). In 1995, the tactical sub-concept was developed. In 1996, the former Airborne Brigade 25 in Calw in the Black Forest was transitioned into the Kommando Spezialkraefte (KSK (Special Forces Command)).

The time schedule for the development of the German ability to perform NEO was as follows:
1. By 1 October 1996, a limited evacuation capability had to be developed to conduct simple evacuation operations. A simple evacuation operation was defined as the evacuation of not more than one hundred evacuees in a low-threat scenario.

2. As a next step, the responsibility for the conduct of NEOs should have been handed over to the KSK as soon as its planned companies achieved their operational readiness status in 1999. Then, the German Armed Forces had to be able to perform NEOs in a hostile environment and to conduct, if necessary, hostage rescue missions.

After FueZBw had issued the “TSK übergreifende Grundlagen für Evakuierungsoperationen” (Joint Principles for the Conduct of NEO) in 1996, German Army Forces Command, as the lead Service Forces Command, developed the “Grundsatzweisung zur Vorbereitung und Durchführung militärischer Evakuierungsoperationen” (Basic Principles for the Preparation and the Conduct of NEO) in 1997.

This process was interrupted by the first German NEO in Albania on 14 March 1997, which is presented later in this chapter. The after action review of the operation led to some changes in the operations concept. The Army concept was issued on 3 November 1997 and has been changed only marginally since this time. As is later shown, on 6 July 1998 another NEO was successfully conducted in Eritrea.

Since 1996 the NEO concept has been exercised annually in FTXs. Furthermore, since 1999 German Army Forces Command has conducted an annual CPX exercise-series “Quick Dolphin.”
Basic German NEO Principles

The following subchapter describes the basic principles of a NEO as laid down by the lead Service Forces Command, the Army Forces Command, in its “Basic principles for the Preparation and the Conduct of NEO.” This document represents the logical and detailed doctrin, derived from the very general “Joint Principles for the Conduct of NEO,” issued by the FueZBw. This hierarchy of documents led to multiple directives and orders. Lesson 2 of Operation Amaryllis has been integrated and incorporated into these principles.

The objective was to develop the ability to conduct NEOs in all imaginable scenarios. The complexity of a joint operation like a NEO, plus the need to react quickly, make it necessary to start a planning process prior to a specific mission and independently from a specific situation. Involved command levels and other agencies that provide personnel, material and associated support to a NEO must be coordinated with.

Figure 20 provides an overview of the key-players in the conduct of a NEO. FueZBw and the three Services Forces Command (Army Forces Command in Koblenz, Air Force Command in Cologne, and Fleetcommand in Kiel) have already been mentioned. KLK/4.Div (Command Airmobile forces/4th Div) in Regensburg provides the operational commander, while the tactical commander comes from the KSK in Calw. The Luftlandebrigade (Airborne brigade) provides additional forces.

Other involved agencies are:

1. Streitkraefteamt (Armed Forces agency) provides the necessary civilian air transport assets;
2. Amt für Militärisches Geowesen (Defense Mapping agency) supports NEOs by supplying all required geographic data;

3. Amt für Nachrichtenwesen der Bundeswehr (Federal Armed Forces Intelligence Office) coordinates national intelligence and provides the assessment of the situation as a basis for the commander’s evaluation for the political and military decision-making process.

4. Amt für Fernmelde- und Informationssystem der Bundeswehr (Communication and Information system agency) operates and establishes the communication links between the agencies in Germany and is responsible to project these links into the mission area;

5. Amt für Wehrgeophysik (Military geophysics agency) prepares the basic geophysics data for advisory service in the mission area.\(^4\)

The conception defines three basic scenarios in which evacuation forces can be used:

1. Land-/Air-/Sea-evacuation with force protection without self-sufficiency;
2. Land-/Air-/Sea-evacuation with force protection with limited self-sufficiency;
3. Land-/Air-/Sea-evacuation with combat action with/without hostage operations.\(^5\)

In the conception force protection has first priority before other tasks. That means that lesson 3 from Operation Amaryllis—overemphasized force protection policies might be counterproductive for the conduct of a NEO—has not been learned or could not be applied. The political implications to accept the responsibility for a killed soldier even outweigh the risk of not accomplishing the mission.\(^6\)
Figure 21 elucidates the basic principle for the employment of the evacuation task force, the so-called Einsatzverband Evakuierungsoperationen (EinsVbdEvakOp (Task Force NEO)). The NEO is generally divided in five phases (figure 22). An alarm schedule triggers necessary alert measures.

Regularly, German Army Forces Command, as Lead Services Command, is responsible for operational planning. Air Forces, Fleet Command, and the other aforementioned agencies are directed to cooperate. The interfaces between the commands are prepared (Lesson 4). As shown in figure 23, German Army Forces Command reorganizes in the case of a NEO into a real joint staff. The operational staff is provided by KLK/4.Div. KLK/4.Div is control command and hence responsible for:

1. The deployment of the evacuation forces from their garrisons to a central assembly area and from there, to the APOE;
2. The preparation of the EinsVbd EvakOp deployment in Germany, and
3. The deployment of the EinsVbd EvakOp to the APOD usually in a host nation country.

The materiel and the equipment for the EinsVbd EvakOp are stockpiled in a central depot near the APOE. The EinsVbd EvakOp therefore does not rely on its own equipment. This is a direct result of lesson 5 from Operation Amaryllis.

For the deployment from the APOE to the APOD in the host country, the Air Force provides up to four Transall C-160s and one B-707/A310 within twenty-four hours and up to ten C-160s and two B-707s/A-310s within seventy-two hours. The readiness conditions of the Air Force are designed to meet these standards. In addition to the military air transport assets, the Streitkraefteamt has entered preliminary contracts with
Airbus Industries that guarantees the availability of one A 300-600 ST in forty-eight hours. The A 300-600 ST is able to lift two CH-53, which make the evacuation forces independent from airfields in the mission area and enhances their freedom of action.\textsuperscript{12}

Lesson 6 has been learned.

The EinsVbdEvakOp operates as a rule from a forward mounting base in the host country in theatre. Ideally the host country fulfills the following prerequisites:

1. Availability of an airport that allows the landing of long-haul aircraft, has a sufficient unloading capacity, and allows the installation of a logistical base;
2. Should the need arise, the availability of adequate harbor facilities;
3. Connections between harbor and airport;
4. Civil or military medical treatment facilities;
5. Accommodations for the soldiers of the EinsVbdEvakOp;
6. Adequate communication infrastructure.\textsuperscript{13}

When the evacuation forces have deployed in the forward mounting base (FMB) in the host country, the EinsVbd EvakOp is assigned under the command of the national commander in country. The EinsVbd EvakOp is then divided between the forces which stay in the FMB and those forces in the so-called “Evakuierungsverband” (EvakVbd (Evacuation unit). The EvakVbd are the forces that conduct the actual NEO in the mission area. The Commander of the EvakVbd conducts the NEO according the guidance from German Army Forces Command and the national commander in country. In certain situations, it is possible that the Ministry of Defense bypasses command levels and takes direct command of the EvakVbd. This was the case in the German NEO in Albania. Secure communication links are established to allow this bypass of command.
levels. Figure 24 provides an overview of the established communication links. The command structure is clearly defined with these principles, and the communication links are guaranteed. This is a result of lessons 7 and 8 being applied from Operation Amaryllis.

Figure 25 shows the maximum anticipated forces for the conduct of a NEO. Out of this modular force system the evacuation force is tailored. Figure 26 clarifies this principle. Like a funnel, the forces are more and more reduced before they arrive in the mission area. This procedure offers a high degree of flexibility, and it guarantees, at the same time, the availability of reserves in the mission area and in Germany. Without exception, the soldiers of the EinsVbd EvakOp are career-service members or short-term volunteers. Lessons 9 and 10 have been learned.

The FueZBw prepares contingency plans for the most probable mission areas. In 1998, a central joint database “Schnell ablaufende Operationen” (SCHNOPS (fast operations)) was installed with management responsibility going to the FueZBw. This database contains essential data for evacuation operations: maps, pictures, contact points, et cetera. Key players have access to this database. Lesson XI has been learned.

The alert measures and the principles of a NEO are trained regularly in joint exercises. The aim of these joint exercises is to check the alert measures, train the procedures, reduce the reaction times, and develop joint working relations on all levels. KLK/4 Div and KSK conduct exercises biannually. The spectrum of these exercises goes from simple alert exercises to an FTX with participation that includes the German Army Forces Command and the other Service Forces Commands. At the same time, the conduct of evacuation operations has also become a standard topic for instruction. For
example, an evacuation exercise is now a mandatory part of the joint exercise series of the general staff course at the Fuehrungsakademie, the German equivalent of the CGSC in Hamburg. Lesson 12, 13, and 14 have been learned.

The medical concept for the support of NEO is based on equipment that can be transported with the Bundeswehr-owned airplanes. The Luftlanderrettungszentrum (LLRZ (airmobile hospital)) forms the core of the medical support. The LLRZ is a hospital that can provide Level III support. It is usually installed in the host nation country. The EvakVbd in the mission area is supported by a minimum of four “luftbewegliche Arzttrupps”(LBAT(air-mobile medical officer teams)). Their task is to prepare the transport of wounded personnel from the mission area to the host nation. In case of emergencies, they are able to conduct surgery if necessary. Lesson 15 has been learned.

Basic ROE for NEOs have been developed on the basis of the three aforementioned basic scenarios. Depending on the situation, ROE have to be modified by the FueZBw. Nevertheless, they provide a framework for the training and the exercises of the evacuation forces. The ROE follow the strict principle of neutrality of the evacuation forces in case of a civil war scenario. Lessons 16 and 17 have been learned.

The media concept for NEO emphasizes the great impact of NEOs on public opinion. Coordination between the Ministry of Defense, German Army Forces Command, and the so-called “Presse- und Informationszentrum” (PIZ (Media and information-center) in the host nation is therefore absolutely mandatory. The media work has to be honest, understandable, and convincing. The basis for good media relations is
mutual trust between the journalist and the military. Journalists have to participate actively in the NEO. If this cooperation can be established, the media can also be used to influence public opinion in the mission area. Lesson 18 has been applied in the German concept.

Finally, procedures for how to deal with evacuees have been developed by KLK/4.Div and KSK. For example, the reception of evacuees in the “Evakuierungscenter,” the center in which the evacuees are prepared for the evacuation, are defined. Every soldier knows what to do. Lesson 19 has been learned.

Review Of The First Missions

The Bundeswehr has conducted two NEOs since 1994, Operation Dragonfly in Albania in 1997 with German Army Forces Command as the Lead Forces Command, and an evacuation conducted by Air Force Command in Eritrea in 1998.

Albania (14 March 1997)

The collapse of a financial pyramid scheme in March 1997—which had attracted deposits from a substantial portion of Albania's population--triggered severe social unrest, which led to more than 1,500 deaths and widespread destruction of property.

On 13 May 1997, the riots increased. The Foreign Ministry, realizing the necessity of evacuating the German citizens from Tirana, requested that the Defense Ministry conduct a NEO as soon as possible. The planning process started at 5:00 p.m. within the FueZBw. Shortly thereafter, in a situation update briefing, the Minister of Defense had already made the decision not to use evacuation forces in accordance with the basic documents. Rather, he wanted to rely on the German SFOR forces in Bosnia.
The German national commander in Bosnia was informed immediately. German Army Forces Command became the Lead Forces Command for the operation. FueZBw gave the mission to be prepared to evacuate German citizens from Albania.

At 9:45 p.m., the first warning order from German Army Forces Command reached the national commander of the German forces in Bosnia. Based on this warning order, the German contingent started its preparations for the NEO. The evacuation forces did not have a clear picture of the situation in Tirana.

Order number 1 from German Army Forces command arrived in Bosnia on 14 March at 1:30 a.m. The frigate Niedersachsen, conducting blockade operations in the northern part of the Adriatic, moved south towards Albania.

Colonel Karrer, the former German military attaché in Tirana, was awakened in the night at his home in Bonn by a call from the Ministry of Defense. He received orders to go to Dubrovnik in order to provide the evacuation force with his detailed knowledge of the local area.

In Bosnia, the evacuation force conducted its mission orders briefing at 6:45 a.m., after which the contingent deployed with helicopters to Dubrovnik. All in all, six CH-53 helicopters, three Transall C-160 airplanes, and the frigate Niedersachsen participated in the operation. The ground forces consisted of eighty-nine soldiers of the armored battalion task force which was part of the German SFOR-contingent. Reserve forces were not pre-planned in the OPLAN. ROE, provided by the FueZBw, arrived too late and could not be distributed.
The evacuation forces reached Dubrovnik at 9:20 a.m. The range of the C-53 helicopter did not permit the round trip flight from Dubrovnik to Tirana without refueling.

Therefore, a stopover in the town of Podgorica in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia was preplanned. Podgorica would serve as the forward operation base (FOB). After Serbian officials had granted landing rights, the evacuation forces deployed at 1:50 p.m. to Podgorica. Unfortunately, the diplomatic clearance never reached Podgorica. The Serbian air-defense forces did not switch off their radar systems until they recognized the SFOR marking on the approaching German helicopters. This could have resulted in a disaster for the evacuation forces.

In the meantime, the FueZBw had taken the lead for the evacuation forces. This procedure was in accordance with the basic principles. After conducting direct coordination with U.S. evacuation forces, the German evacuation forces started their mission from Podgorica at 3:02 p.m.

At 3:21 p.m., U.S. helicopters approaching the planned landing site near the U.S. Embassy were fired upon by anti-aircraft missiles and artillery. The landing attempt was aborted. The German ambassador directed the evacuees to an alternate landing site two kilometers away.

The German helicopters reached the new landing site in Tirana at 3:40 p.m. and a security perimeter was quickly established. Unfortunately, more than 600 Albanians had also reached the landing site and intermingled with the waiting evacuees. The embassy personnel were not able to prevent this.
At 3:55 p.m., while the evacuation forces started to separate the evacuees from the Albanians, two armored trucks from the Albanian security police approached the landing site and started to fire on the helicopters. The evacuation forces reacted promptly. Machine-gun fire drove off the attackers immediately. Three attackers were hit. After having separated the evacuees from the Albanians, the last helicopter lifted off at 4:09 p.m.

It arrived in Podgorica at 4:48 p.m. The evacuees were transferred to two waiting Transall C-160s and were flown to Cologne. The evacuation forces landed at 7:30 p.m. in Dubrovnik. Operation Libelle (Dragonfly) was successfully completed.

The after action review shows that the command and control organization was effective. Warning orders had been given in time, and they were appropriate. The evacuation forces had the necessary freedom of action. The decision to rely on SFOR forces in Bosnia because they were already in the vicinity of Albania was suitable due to the gain of time (lesson 9). Nevertheless, several critical remarks must be made:

1. A clear picture of the situation in Tirana never existed because situation updates came too late.

2. The deployment of Colonel Karrer was a less than ideal solution for gaining local knowledge about Tirana. An appropriate database providing essential information, including maps of the mission area, did not exist. The helicopter pilots were navigating over Tirana with a guidebook personally owned by Colonel Karrer. This lack of essential data in the operation would lead to the development of the aforementioned central database SCHNOPS.
3. Even under enormous pressure of time, standard flight procedures must be followed. The German helicopters should not have approached Podgorica without having made sure that the diplomatic clearance had been secured.

4. The evacuation forces went into Tirana without having any reserve forces. In case of a problem, the German Forces would have heavily relied on the American forces conducting their Operation “Silver Wake.”

5. ROE arrived too late to be translated into action.

6. The preparation of the evacuees by the embassy was absolutely insufficient. The evacuees were mixed up with a crowd of panicking Albanians at the landing site when the evacuation forces arrived.

Triggered by the lessons learned from Operation Dragonfly the drafts of the basic evacuation documents, which were nearly finalized in spring 1997, were again reviewed. As the result of this process, essential changes focused on the necessity of a broad evacuation database were made by the FueZBw.

Eritrea (6 June 1998)

On 6 June 1998, the German Air Force successfully evacuated seventy German and another 140 Western European citizens out of Asmara, the capital of Eritrea. Eritrea had been in a military conflict with its neighbor Ethiopia since 6 May 1998. The war started when the Eritrean military occupied the border town of Badame after a skirmish between Ethiopians and Eritrean police. The German Embassy asked for the evacuation of the European citizens when Ethiopian MiG 23s attacked the international airport in Asmara three times on 5 June. The Foreign Ministry requested the Defense Ministry to evacuate the threatened Germans and other European citizens at 3:00 p.m. on the same
day. According to doctrinal procedures, the FueZBw assigned Luftwaffensführungs-Kommando ((LwFueKdo) Air Forces Command) at 7:00 p.m. to be the lead forces command for the operation.

On 6 June 6 at 1:00 a.m., an A-310 departed from the military part of the Cologne airport. The need for forces to protect the airplane was not foreseen. In the meantime, Eritrea and Ethiopia accepted a cease-fire until the 8 June at 7:00 a.m. to allow the evacuation of the threatened Europeans. The representative of the German Lufthansa office assessed the airport operational.

After a stopover in Luxor, the A-310 approached Asmara at 2:45 p.m., shortly after U.S. Marines had been flown in to secure the airport. Two employees of the Lufthansa office in Asmara had prepared the evacuees for departure, while the secretary of the embassy had maintained the telephonic contact with the FueZBw. The evacuation force picked up the evacuees and left Asmara at 3:30 p.m. After the German plane left, a U.S., a British, and an Italian aircraft evacuated additional American and Western European citizens. After another stopover in Djiddah, Saudi-Arabia, the A-310 returned to Cologne.

A contingency plan had been prepared in case the A-310 would not have been able to land in Asmara. In this case, the Europeans would have been transported by bus to the coast and would have been evacuated by four C-160s from a small airstrip. The C-160s were on standby in Luxor. A total of 210 European, among them seventy Germans, were evacuated.

Assessment: FueZBw and LwFueKdo did not follow the procedures exactly according to the basic documents. Nevertheless, the LwFueKdo reacted quickly and
could get an A-310 ready within a short period of time. The critical point in the after-action review was that no security forces had been on board of the A-310. This violated a basic planning principle that called for a platoon of paratroopers, reinforced by commandos, to protect the airplane. The risk was taken because U.S. Marines secured the airport. This allowed the airplane to fly out thirty more evacuees, because it could save the weight of the unused security forces.

Nevertheless, the NEO in Asmara did not follow the basic principles and could only be successful because U.S. forces guaranteed the security of the airport.

Further Need For Refinement

The review of the German operations in Albania and Eritrea leads to the following conclusions. First, both operations were successful. Second, a lot of luck was involved. Third, neither operation closely followed basic German NEO doctrine. In Albania, forces available in the mission area were used, instead of the preplanned NEO contingent. In Eritrea, no security forces were aboard the evacuation aircraft because the German evacuation forces heavily relied on U.S. security forces. Fourth, both operations were not pure German NEOs. During Operation Dragonfly, there was permanent coordination between German and the U.S. forces on Ministry of Defense level, and the role of the U.S. Marines in Eritrea has been described previously. To summarize, the pure German NEO capability is adequate, with certain limitations. There is still the need for a lot of refinement. Furthermore, it has become obvious that the goal of the Chief of the Army to develop a pure German NEO capability was shortsighted. It should have been expanded from the beginning to the goal of developing a multinational capability.
To give one example, even if the assessment of Operation Amaryllis has shown that the C-160s and C-130s could handle the whole air transport operation, strategic air assets must still be available for NEOs. To rent civilian air transport assets is a makeshift solution, and to buy own German strategic air assets is not political feasible, so what can be done? The answer is, rely on our international allies. This conclusion leads back to the lessons that have not yet been learned from Operation Amaryllis.

Three lessons have not yet been put into action in a sufficient manner.

As mentioned earlier, think multinationally, lesson 20, still has to be developed. Especially in a larger NEO, the combined operation offers the greater prospect of success. The French-Belgium cooperation in 1994 points the way ahead. The cooperation has to happen on the level of the Ministry of Defense, as well as on the operational and tactical level. Efforts to develop a multinational rescue capability, as for example the 1996 initiative of the Western European Union (WEU) in Brussels, must be intensified. The interfaces between the different military organizations of the German Armed Forces are defined. Nevertheless, the interdepartmental cooperation process has not yet reached the precision it should have; lesson 4 has not yet been learned. A comprehensive crisis cell that includes departments involved in NEO has not yet been institutionalized. The German Foreign Ministry still fights against cooperation with the Defense Ministry because it fears to lose the lead function in the crisis management of NEO scenarios. The German crisis management system is therefore still far behind the effective procedures of the French example of handling the Rwanda crises. Also, not yet solved is the cooperation between the evacuation forces and the embassy in country. The
lack of preparation of the evacuees in the Albania NEO by the embassy personnel nearly led to a disaster. There is an urgent need for action.

Finally, the use of foreign training facilities, according to lesson XXI, has not yet been realized. Negotiations with partner nations are currently under way to address this question.

Summary

As this thesis has shown, the German Bundeswehr has greatly improved its NEO capability in the last six years. Shocked by its inability to evacuate threatened Germans out of the radio station Deutsche Welle in Kigali in 1994, an enormous amount of effort has been undertaken to correct the deficiencies in organization, personnel, preparedness, and available procedures. This was done in an attempt to counter the assessment that the Bundeswehr could not conduct a NEO.

New forces were created and the different services developed a joint concept. Materiel and equipment is now prepared. Two actual NEOs and a large number of training exercises have shown that the concept in general works. Nevertheless, it should not been forgotten that both NEOs were only a success because the evacuation forces were either lucky or because the NEO was supported by U.S. forces. The necessary refinement has been identified in the last subchapter. The fact is that the new lessons from the NEOs in Albania and in Eritrea have been learned by the German Armed Forces. The NEO concept has been improved. For example, one of the results of these new lessons learned is the SCHNOPS database in the FueZBw.

Learning from our partners was an effective approach to tackling the challenge to develop a NEO concept. France, being Germany’s closest European partner and having
an extensive experience in conducting NEOs, provided Operation Amaryllis as an example for a successful evacuation operation.

Using Operation Amaryllis as a model does not mean that the German Army should totally copy the French command and control techniques or the French array of forces. This makes no sense due to the different basic conditions, such as the French pre-positioned forces in Africa. Rather, Operation Amaryllis offers the Bundeswehr something to think about in developing its own techniques. Most of the lessons that could have been learned from Operation Amaryllis, have been put in action. However, there is still the need to develop interdepartmental interfaces.

Will the Chief of the Army not see repeated what happened in Rwanda in 1994? Do the German Armed Forces have the capability to “handle a crisis like this themselves?” The answer is yes with certain limitations. For example that the German Armed Forces will still rely on civilian strategic air transport assets if a NEO cannot be conducted with C-160s for some reason. Nevertheless, several exercises in the last four years have proven that the NEO principles have been internalized by all German NEO planners and forces. Additionally, the NEOs in Albania and in Eritrea were a success insofar that all threatened citizens could be evacuated, nobody—soldier or evacuee—was injured, and the mission was accomplished.

The thesis has also shown that the goal of the Chief of the Army to develop a pure German NEO capability was shortsighted. It should have been expanded from the beginning to the goal of developing a multinational NEO capability. The NEO concept should have been widened to principles of how to perform NEOs in a multinational environment. Here lies the challenge for the next years. To summarize, the goal is find a
feasible interdepartmental approach and, together with our partner nations, to enlarge the existing national concept into a multinational approach.

Nevertheless, the assessment today is that a situation like 1994, when the foreign policy apparatus failed and the Bundeswehr did not possess the necessary NEO capability, will never happen again. Inspired by the French evacuation concept, the Bundeswehr has learned most of the necessary lessons from Operation Amaryllis and from German NEOs in Albania and Eritrea. The next time German citizens are threatened anywhere in the world, the German Armed Forces will be ready to respond.

1 Welt (Hamburg), 29 December 1995.
2 For example, three Bell UH ID can be transported with two C-160.
3 HFueKdo G3 Operation, Grundsatzweisung zur Vorbereitung und Durchfuehrung militaerischer Evakuierungsoperationen (Koblenz: HFueKdo, 1997), 9-10.
5 Ibid., 13.
6 Ibid., 13.
7 Ibid., 13-14.
8 Ibid., 14.
9 Ibid., figure J.
10 Ibid., 15.
11 Ibid., 21-23.
12 Ibid., 10.
13 Ibid., 13.
\(^{14}\)Ibid., 14-15.

\(^{15}\)Ibid., 17-18.

\(^{16}\)Ibid., 34.

\(^{17}\)Uwe Jansohn, Vortragsfolien *Evakuierungsoperation Libelle* (Koblenz, HFueKdo G 3 Op, 1998), 1-50.

\(^{18}\)Uwe Jansohn, *Vorlage fuer Befehlshaber Heeresfuehrungskommando* (Koblenz, HFueKdo G 3 Op, 1998), 1-3.

\(^{19}\)The Operation in Eritrea was not a pure national NEO anymore.
Fig. 1. RWANDA and its neighbors
Fig. 2. Airfields in RWANDA
Fig 4. Forces in KIGALI

1: HQ FAR
2: FAR-Battalion (Inf)
3: FAR-Battalion (Anti-tank)
4: FAR-Battalion (Reconnaissance)
5: FAR-Presidential Guard (Bn)
6: FAR-Battalion (Para)
7: FAR-Battalion (Sniper)
8: Gendarmerie (2 Bn)

KIGALI downtown
Fig. 5. Location of the French evacuees.
Fig. 6. 062100 Apr: Alerted units
Fig. 7. 070000 Apr-080000 Apr Situation in KIGALI

3 km
2 miles
Fig. 8. 080000 Apr-090000 Apr Situation in KIGALI

3 km
2 miles
Fig. 10. 100000 Apr- 110000 Apr Situation in KIGALI

1. Hotel Meridien
2. Army HQ
3. FR Embassy
4. Camp de Gendarmerie
5. Parliament
6. FR Gymsilium
7. Camp Kimurura
8. KIGALI downtown
9. Terminal
10. 8th RPIMA
11. Airport KANOMBE-KIGALI

11:15

3 km
2 miles

493 evacuees

8 afternoon

Over the day

122
Fig. 11. 110000 Apr-120000 Apr Situation in KIGALI
Fig. 12. 120000 Apr - 130000 Apr Situation in KIGALI
Fig. 14. Contingency Planning

- Planning of these options
- Identification of the most probable options for the necessity to evacuate
- Contingency plans are developed down to regimental level
Fig. 15. French Forces in Africa in 1994

total: 8000 Soldiers, joint
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<th>23</th>
<th>130</th>
<th>127</th>
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Fig. 17. Employed French Forces
Fig. 18. Communication links
Shuttles:
- BANGUI-KIGALI-BANGUI: 2920 km
- KIGALI-BUJUMBURA-KIGALI: 360 km
- BANGUI-BUJUMBURA-BANGUI: 2940 km
- BANGUI-N'DJAMENA-BANGUI: 1900 km
- BANGUI-BOUAR-BANGUI: 760 km

Total flight times:
- in 9 days: 313 hrs 50 minutes
- C-160: 80%
- C-130: 9%

Shuttles N'DJAMENA-BANGUI und BOUAR-BANGUI: 11%

Fig. 19. Air movements
Fig. 20. Overview over the key-players in a NEO.
Fig. 21. Basic principle for the employment of the evacuation task force
1) A liaison team is send to the German Embassy in the mission area
2) Build up of forces in the FMB in the host nation
3) EvakVbd deploys in mission area
4) Evacuees are assembled in Marshaling points
5) Transport of the evacuees to the marshaling area

Figure 22 - The five phases of an evacuation operation
Fig. 23. Organization of German Army Forces Command in case of a NEO
Fig. 24. Realized Communication links
Fig. 25. Maximum of foreseen forces
Figure 26: "Funnel" principle for the reduction of the evacuation forces
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